

# EAST EUROPE

*A Monthly Review of East European Affairs*

## TOURIST TRAVEL IN THE SOVIET BLOC

A detailed account of tourist facilities in Eastern Europe, the effort to attract visitors from the West, and the new policies governing travel by Satellite citizens.

## CHINA THROUGH YUGOSLAV EYES

Vivid and perceptive accounts by Yugoslav newspaper correspondents of conditions inside Red China: brainwashing, food shortages, and the "great leap forward."

## SLIM CLEARANCE: AFTER 1970

What is behind Czechoslovakia's new housing program.

## POLAND'S YOUNG "TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA"

The Eyes of student scientists and engineers in present-day Poland; Communism as seen by its young elite.

## BIRTH CONTROL PROPAGANDA

Recent departures from the classic Communist attitude toward population growth in Hungary and China.

## CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev in Albania. Attacks on Italy and Greece. Integrating economies of the area. Collectivization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. New prices in Poland.

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# EAST EUROPE

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# The Month in Review

THE MONTH'S SLACKENING in the tempo of events in Eastern Europe, the noticeable downward modulation in the usual chorus of exhortation to economic struggle and execration for political deviation, was this year more than the usual result of summer's coming. To an unaccustomed degree, the regimes of the area trained their perceptions and concern outward, toward the great stage where the world's tensions strained and crackled. Primarily, of course, to Geneva and the deliberations of the Foreign Ministers. The whole bloc was tireless in reiteration of the correctness of the Soviet stand and the iniquity of the other Big Three. Those two countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which are historical symbols of the German aggression of World War II, particularly stressed the alleged dangers of what they trumpeted as a revived militarism in West Germany, at the service of "American imperialism," and of West Germany's alleged hysteria of "revanchism."



The most striking silence on internal affairs of the area was toward Yugoslavia. For a year, Tito and his government have been the subject of increasingly vituperative accusations of political and economic heresy, of being the fountainhead of the current leading violation of dogma, revisionism. Suddenly, these voices all but stopped. On the day that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev arrived in Albania for his ten-day visit, he proffered Marshal Tito cordial congratulations on his birthday. And in all Khrushchev's incessant flow of speeches and pronouncements in the little country which had spearheaded the anti-Tito campaign and which has historic animosities against Yugoslavia, Khrushchev completely refrained from the kind of attack on Tito's regime which had become a staple.

Instead, the Soviet leader turned his fire on Greece and Italy, threatening these NATO countries with dire retaliation if they permit US rocket missile bases to be established on their territories. Soviet rocket bases will in turn, he said, be set up in Albania, Bulgaria or elsewhere: "Where will our rocket installations be placed—here, on Albanian territory? Or will the rockets come down on the rocket bases in Greece from Bulgaria or another country? These are questions which we shall discuss and agree on among ourselves."

This campaign of intimidation against Italy and Greece on the rocket-base question was, of course, taken up by the rest of the area. In addition, Bulgaria (which, as Greece's neighbor, was in the forefront of the agitation over missile sites), indulged in obdurate haggling with that country over war reparations it still owed.

Khrushchev himself, and other Soviet sources, made an explicit connection between the propaganda campaign directed against Greek and Italian missile sites and Yugoslavia. The latter country has come out in favor of the Soviet plan for a meeting of Balkan nations to arrange for a ban on nuclear weapons in the area, and Khrushchev held up the Yugoslav position as a model its "allies" should follow in this matter. Here again, it would seem, there is a connection between the silences and speeches of the month.

Indeed, a very remarkable silence concerned the admission by Marshal Tito that there recently had been student riots in his country. Tito stated that the demonstrations were basically in protest of poor food, but admitted that there was a political meaning to them; he also excoriated Communist China for making propaganda hay out of the incident, and implied that the demonstrations had been at least in part provoked by Yugoslavia's enemies within the "Socialist camp." Astonishingly, however, the Soviet bloc (with the exception of China) utterly refrained from comment on the riots; this after a period when the entire fabric of Yugoslav life had been subjected to the most searching criticism, and every admission of failure or flaw in that fabric had been seized upon by the bloc with great and noisy gloating. The silence can only in part be explained by the Communist regimes' reluctance even to mention, after the Hungarian Revolt, the subject of student demonstrations, their unwillingness to hint to their own students that such activities, even in a "revisionist" nation, are possible.

The relative lack of noise and motion this month on the subject of agriculture and agricultural collectivization was less surprising; in summer the peasants are generally left to do their labors without the disruption attendant on collectivization campaigns. In addition, Hungary and Romania have finished a fall and spring dedicated to a sharp increase in agricultural collectivization and are now pausing to consolidate the kolkhozes. However, a new Hungarian law calls for the commassation of collective lands and "voluntary exchange" of private lands where they are judged to interfere with the collective holdings; it is strongly reminiscent of the most hated practices of the Stalinist period, although there is as yet no indication how far the regime will go in putting these practices into operation.

The month's event of greatest significance for the long-range future of the area was a meeting (in Tirana, Albania, whose primitive facilities must be painfully strained by its new popularity as a convention town for Communist bigwigs) of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, COMECON. This involved not simply the internal affairs of any one country but the continued general reorganization and structuring of all of Eastern Europe and its integration with the economy of the Soviet Union. This particular meeting laid special stress on the fuel and power shortage which is a chronic problem in the area, but it also dealt with such matters as specialization in the production of machinery and metallurgical production.

And in a month notable for its silences, the bitterest of them: June 17 was the first anniversary of the announcement of the execution by the Kadar regime of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter, leaders of the Hungarian Revolt who were promised freedom and then murdered; there was no mention of the anniversary in the newspapers of Budapest.





Two travel posters of Orbis, the Polish tourist agency, urging vacations in Poland. They say, in French, "Orbis invites you to the Polish seashore," and "Winter in Poland."

Poland (Warsaw), No. 10, 1957

## Tourist Travel in the Soviet Bloc

*International tourist traffic in Eastern Europe is increasing rapidly and becoming an important source of foreign currency revenue and good-will propaganda for the regimes. This article indicates the growth and conditions of travel both into and out of the area, and some of the Communist plans and techniques for drawing tourists from the rest of the world.*

**D**ESPITE SPORADIC tempests on the diplomatic peaks, the prevailing climate for tourists in Eastern Europe is sunny and mild. Since 1955, when tourism was resumed under Khrushchev's formula of East-West "coexistence and contacts," the Soviet bloc regimes have been soliciting visitors from abroad, particularly from the West. All these countries now have tourism development programs. In addition to the standard scenic attractions, resorts, historical sites, et al., the East European countries are developing their facilities for sports, such as hiking and skiing. Currently, game hunting is being promoted as a special feature for foreign tourists. Music, film, folklore festivals are aimed in large part at the foreign trade.

In addition, the Communist regimes are exploiting patriotic and family sentiments to draw visitors from the

West. Citizens of Western democracies who are of East European origin or descent—emigres once branded as Western "spies" and "traitors"—are now being urged to return for visits to their homeland and relatives.

The two highly stereotyped forms of travel which alone were permitted in the Stalin era continue and indeed still constitute the bulk of travel in the Soviet bloc. These are the delegations of scientists, writers, students and professional groups, which circulate continually in and out of the bloc, and the trade union excursions for Stakhanovites, Party activists and other model citizens. Business trips between East and West have also increased. But travel for purely personal reasons, for recreation, visiting and sight-seeing, is a radical departure from the psychology and practices of "fortress Communism."

The regimes are gradually taking steps to ease the practical conditions of travel to Eastern Europe; for—quite apart from political considerations—the bureaucratic circumlocutions, restrictions and delays in issuing papers, and the artificially high rates of currency exchange in the Soviet bloc, threatened to keep tourism from developing on a mass scale. Now most of the regimes have established special, lower currency rates for tourists, and are issuing special visas speedily, usually subject to the advance purchase of coupons covering all living expenses. (Regular, non-tourist visas are also issued, at the old rate of speed, usually several months.)

The main material obstacle to the expansion of tourism in Eastern Europe is the shortage of hotels. Tourism was an early victim of Stalinist economics as well as politics, since this form of activity contributed nothing to the forced-draft industrialization of the area. Hotels and recreational facilities were taken over by the Army, the trade unions, and the Party-State bureaucracy for quarters and offices. Little or no funds were invested in maintaining hotels and restaurants, and standards of cuisine and service deteriorated in the hands of inadequate and enfeebled staffs, composed mainly of "labor rejects" from the factories and mines. Now the Communist regimes are investing heavily in new guest facilities, as well as roads, restoration of historical monuments and popular oldtime resorts, and training schools for hotel staffs, guides and travel personnel.

In its pursuit of Western visitors, the Soviet bloc has several objectives. An important one is the need for hard currencies. Another—a prime factor in the original 1955 move to restore international tourism—is the desire of the Communists to replace the scowling image of Stalinism with a new, smiling Communist face radiating good will and confidence. Tourism between the Communist and free world is regarded by Communist leaders both as a means to and an expression of one of the foremost political goals of the post-Stalin regime: Western acceptance of permanent Communist control of Eastern Europe.

The more blatant trappings of the police State have therefore been put away (although the dismantling in 1955 of the border fortifications between Hungary and the West in Europe proved a trifle premature, and these were restored in Hungary after the 1956 upheavals).

Bans on taking photographs, on bringing Western newspapers and books into the area, etc., have been dropped, and the foreign tourist is increasingly on his own, at least superficially. Three years ago, Western tourists could travel only in strictly organized and supervised groups. This year they are being encouraged to drive their own or rented cars, without chauffeurs or interpreters.

Tourist movements are still observed, mainly, it is believed, by the personnel of the State travel agencies and the hotels. In some places or at certain times foreigners must still obtain police permission to depart from their scheduled itinerary. But tourists are isolated from the real life of the country less by explicit taboos than by economic segregation: the deluxe hotels, resorts, shops and night clubs designated for foreign visitors are not only far beyond the financial means of the local population, but are often

barred to them in any case, on grounds of a shortage of space. The gap between foreign tourists and the people is probably greatest in Bulgaria and Hungary, with their developing network of facilities constituting a sort of well-upholstered tourist ghetto. It is smallest in Poland, both because Polish life in general is freer and looser and because the regime has not had the economic resources to build up an elaborate apparatus especially for tourists.

Travel has also been "liberated" for the citizens of the Soviet bloc, but on a much more restricted basis. Most of it takes place within the boundaries of the bloc. A feature of 1958 was the inauguration of organized tourist excursions between Eastern Europe and Red China. And it is noteworthy that, despite the extreme strain in Soviet bloc relations with Yugoslavia, East European tourist travel to Yugoslavia has not been summarily cut off.\*

Travel is extremely expensive for East Europeans traveling on other than official, organized (trade union, professional, etc.) excursions. Thus there has apparently developed considerable illegal trading and smuggling among Soviet bloc tourists, carried on in large part to finance their trips.

Unquestionably the liberalization of travel has been one of the most popular moves of the post-Stalin leadership in Eastern Europe. The "freezing" of movement in the Stalin era built up a strong craving for travel: in the numerous Polish public opinion polls it is usually cited, along with a private apartment, as the supreme wish of Polish young people. Similarly, Western tourists are eagerly received by the people in Eastern Europe, if only because of their exoticism.

This new policy has not been without its hazards for the regimes. Their citizens who travel to the West have been known to make their vacations from Communism permanent. The appearance of Western visitors, their clothes and cars, on the streets of the East European cities contributed to the unrest which preceded the 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary. Nevertheless, the Communist leaders apparently regard the advantages of this policy as decisive, even (perhaps especially) at periods of high tension in East-West political relations.

## Hungary

OVER 200,000 FOREIGN tourists visited Hungary in 1957, the year after the Revolt. The Kadar regime asserted that, despite the "counterrevolution," this was the largest number since the Communist postwar accession in Hungary. It was also announced that almost 150,000 Hungarians travelled legally to foreign countries in 1957: fewer than in 1956, but more than in any other year under Communism. (*Statistikair Havi Kozlemenyek* [Budapest], February 1958.)

An official encouragement of travel is, in Hungary, primarily a matter of international public relations. The Kadar regime is anxious to remove the stigma of its ori-

\* But while no formal policy has been announced, both Czechoslovakia and Hungary have apparently suspended tourist travel to Yugoslavia this year.



Sightseers in Prague. Caption: "A stream of visitors from the West, especially from the United States, also brings a great number of former Czechoslovak citizens who, after many years of emigration and wandering, want to see their old homeland again. Prague's favorable location makes it a favorite air terminal point this year for tourists from the West who want to get to know the looks of the Socialist camp, especially the USSR, China and Poland."

*Tschechoslowakei* (Prague), No. 1, 1958

gin by demonstrating its consolidation of control and the seeming "normalcy" of conditions in Hungary under its administration.

Thus, the newspaper *Kisalföld* of Gyor—a main travel center on the Vienna-Budapest route—wrote on May 18, 1957:

"'Budapest is a very nice city,' Western guests say when they leave Hungary. At the Austro-Hungarian border the buses stop purely for the sake of formalities. . . . The passengers discuss their impressions of Hungary. Budapest is a great metropolis. They marvelled at the number of automobiles on its streets, which contradicted what they had heard about it. 'We expected armored cars and security squads at every corner, identity checks and all that. But we moved about without interference. . . . We thank you for your hospitality and hope to see you again. . . .'"

A large percentage of the Western visitors to Hungary (as also to Poland and Czechoslovakia) are emigres or their descendants who return to visit relatives. Under all previous Communist regimes in Hungary, such trips were difficult to arrange and involved some risk to visitor and visited. Under Kadar, visas are issued readily to emigres, and the regime even arranges group excursions for large numbers of them, a practice unheard of before the Revolt.

To bring in more visitors, Ibusz (the Hungarian State tourist agency) is pressing Western airlines which cover Eastern Europe and the Middle East to include Budapest in their routes.\* Ibusz is also planning to cut in on the

growing traffic from the West to Russia. A recent conference of Intourist (the Soviet tourist agency) and Ibusz officials discussed plans for incorporating a stopover in Budapest in the itinerary of groups headed for Moscow.

The Soviet bloc countries, of course, supply the bulk of tourists to Hungary. In 1957 there were 30,000 visitors from Czechoslovakia; 8,700 came from Yugoslavia, 4,548 from Poland, and 1,000 from the Soviet Union.\* 869 came from North and South America, including about 500 from the US.\*\*

No 1958 total figures have been published, but it is claimed (e.g., the English-language *Hungarian Review* [Budapest], January 1959) that the 1958 traffic greatly surpassed the previous year's. According to Western estimates, there was an increase of 20-25 percent, almost entirely in Soviet bloc tourists.

A 30 percent increase, much of it from the West, is expected in 1959, according to Radio Budapest, February 6, 1959. Ibusz is preparing for 20,000 tourists from France, Italy, Austria, West Germany, Belgium and Great Britain.

### Construction and Restoration

The main tourist centers in Hungary are the capital city of Budapest, the Lake Balaton district, and to a lesser extent the Great Plain.

Hungary was a popular tourist country before the war, and the Kadar regime has announced grandiose plans to restore the tourist industry to at least the prewar standard.

The hotel shortage is the most urgent problem, since many of the country's hotels fell victim to war or the depredations of Communist administrative bodies in search of office space.\*\*\* The construction of modern new ones now has high priority in building plans for Budapest. According to an article titled "The Most Modern Hotels in Europe on the Bank of the Danube" (*Nepszava* [Budapest], May 11, 1958), the Hotel Hungaria is to be reconstructed with a 300-car garage and 300 rooms, each with private balcony and a radio-TV set; the Hotel Duna will be fully modernized and expanded; and two new seven-story deluxe hotels will be built, one on the former site of the Ritz Hotel, and the other on Roosevelt Square. The Hungaria and Duna Hotels are to be completed in 1959; the two new hotels in 1960-61.

Further, according to the January 20, 1959 issue of *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), the Ronpe Hotel in the capital will be turned into one of the most modern hotels in

\* These figures, from *Statistikai Havi Közlemények* (Budapest), February 1958, apparently include all visitors, not only tourists. According to Czechoslovak sources, less than 15,000 Czechoslovak tourists went to Hungary in 1958, and this was a 150 percent increase over 1957. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], February 10, 1959.)

\*\* The United States, which has not granted full recognition to the Kadar regime, limits US travel to Hungary to specific business approved by the State Department.

\*\*\* According to *Statistikai Szemle* (Budapest), July 1958, between 1937-1957 the number of hotels in Hungary dropped by 86 percent, the accommodation capacity by 60 percent. There were 156 hotels in Budapest in 1937; in 1957, there were only 18. By comparison, Vienna had 200 hotels in 1954, and in 1956 Prague had 52.

\* As of December 1957, 64 foreign airlines made scheduled stops at the Ferihegy Airport in Budapest. The Hungarian airline Malev was operating ten flights abroad. (*Nepszabadsag*, December 29, 1957.)

Europe. "Every room will have a wired television set, an innovation not a single European hotel can boast of," said the paper.

The regime apparently intends to preserve the archaic splendors of the old Hotel Gellert, which was traditionally the choice of celebrities and European royalty. The newspapers write glowingly of distinguished visitors at the Gellert, and sometimes reminisce (with considerable relish) about the nobility who formerly patronized it (e.g., *Ország Világ* [Budapest], May 15, 1958).\*

The first-class Budapest restaurants—which are patronized almost exclusively by foreign tourists and high-ranking Communists—are also being mobilized in the tourism drive. These restaurants now feature "dinner competitions," which are promoted by the hotel managers and tour guides. (In February 1958 leading Budapest restaurants held a "dinner competition" for which only 100-200 year-old recipes were used.)

Up to December 1958, hotel charges for room and meals averaged \$10-\$13 per day; at the beginning of this year they went up to \$13-\$15. (Official exchange rate is 11.16 forint-\$1; tourist rate is approximately double.)

Other projects in addition to hotel construction listed


\* The shortage of accommodations in Budapest is sometimes alleviated by placing tourists—but only domestic tourists—in private homes as paying guests. (*Magyar Nemzet*, February 20, 1958). The regime does not sanction such close contacts between foreigners and Hungarians.

in a three-year plan for tourism development include the restoration of the Citadel, one of the historical sights of Budapest, and the building of low-cost tourist hotels in its vicinity. 50 million forint have been allocated to modernize and expand local medicinal springs and baths. The historical monuments of the Turkish occupation throughout the country—which are unique in Europe—will be restored. A network of service stations and garages is projected. (*Magyar Nemzet*, July 12, 1958.)

The second major tourist center in Hungary, Lake Balaton, suffers even more than Budapest from a shortage of accommodations. According to *Nepszabadsag*, January 22, 1959, nearly 200 million forint will be spent on Lake Balaton improvements in 1958-60. New motor courts will add approximately 1,360 beds to the hotel network of the region, and over 20 sites have been allocated for tent camps along the lake.

During the summer of 1959 the Lake Balaton resorts will feature a major international chess tournament and an international sports car race. *Magyar Nemzet* reported on November 15, 1958, that, in connection with the Communist World Youth Conference in Vienna in July 1959, an international youth camp will be erected on the shores of Lake Balaton.

An attraction developed particularly for West Europeans is game hunting on the large estates confiscated by the Communists and in some instances maintained as hunt-



Waiting room of the Ferihegy International Airport in Budapest, built by the Communist regime to be one of the most modern airports in the Soviet bloc.

Photo from *Hungary* (Budapest), July-August, 1954



ing preserves. So far, hunting parties have reportedly come from West Germany, Belgium, France, Scandinavia and England; the newspapers often quote the enthusiastic comments of German industrialists and other wealthy "capitalists" who make up these parties.

### Hungarian Travel Abroad

During the pre-Revolt "thaw" in Hungary, there was considerable freedom and eagerness to travel. Hungarian writers and intellectuals in particular visited France and Italy. In the summer of 1956, after the Tito-Khrushchev rapprochement, ordinary Hungarian tourists went in large numbers to Yugoslavia, a traditional vacation spot, and their experiences and impressions—almost uniformly enthusiastic—were publicized in the Hungarian press.

After the suppression of the Revolt, borders to the West were sealed. By the end of 1957, travel to the West was tentatively resumed. At first, a few closely supervised tourist excursions went to Paris and Italy, then were extended to Austria, and to Belgium for the World's Fair.

Tourist travel from Hungary to Yugoslavia was reportedly suspended at the end of 1958, as Soviet bloc relations with Tito deteriorated.

The Kadar regime has shown a certain leniency toward persons implicated, but not prominent, in the political disaffection before and during the Revolt. At the end of 1957 some of the "Rajkists" (followers of Rajk, the "Titoist" purged in 1949) who were released from prison just before the Revolt, were permitted to take medical trips to Italy. Since early in 1958 a growing number of Hungarian citizens, irrespective of their political record, have been granted leaves of two to four weeks to go to non-Communist countries, mainly Austria, for the purpose of visiting relatives. Politically "reliable" citizens may participate in a few, closely supervised group tours, such as cruises on the Mediterranean. These trips cost 7-9000 *forint*, which is out of reach of most people.

Thus far in 1959, conducted group tours from Hungary to the West have been reported only in Vienna, and according to Viennese accounts, the participants were members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, "model workers" and actors and actresses.

The bulk of the Ibusz tourist excursions for Hungarians go to other countries in the Soviet bloc. The most popular of these are the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia and Romania, both of which contain, in Slovakia and Transylvania, large Hungarian minorities. 8,000 Hungarians were reported to have visited Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1958. *Nepszabadsag*, October 3, 1958, reported that 2,300 Hungarian tourists visited the Soviet Union in 1958; 4,500 are to go in 1959.

Illegal trade by tourists is reportedly carried out between Hungary and the Soviet bloc countries, particularly Czechoslovakia. Popular items of exchange are Czechoslovak-made clothing and food products from Hungary.)

### Youth Travel

At the beginning of 1958 a special organization, the Express Youth Enterprise, was set up to handle travel

abroad for youth. According to *Nepszabadsag*, January 25, 1958, two-week group tours to the Soviet Union, East Germany, Switzerland, and the Black Sea resorts were planned for the Spring of 1958, at a fee of 1,200-1,800 *forint* (much lower than the regular fee for equivalent trips).

*Figyelo* (Budapest), December 2, 1958, said that between March-November 1958, some 4,340 young people spent two-week vacations abroad. During the winter of 1958-59 a larger number were scheduled to go on group excursions, particularly to Moscow, "where they would attend the winter balls in the Kremlin." In 1959 the KISZ (Communist Youth League) will take approximately 5,000 young people, with an age limit of 30, on conducted tours abroad. According to the paper, the KISZ tours would go also to non-Communist countries; but so far these have not materialized.

## Czechoslovakia

WITH THE HIGHEST living standard in the Soviet bloc, Czechoslovakia is probably the most materially advanced tourist country in the area, offering the closest approximation of Western standards of efficiency and comfort. In 1955, first year of the post-Stalin revival of tourism, about 8,300 foreigners visited Czechoslovakia, 2,700 of them from the Free World. In 1958, according to *Hospodarske Noviny* (Prague), March 3, 1959, over 80,000 foreign tourists visited the country, 25,000 of them from the West.\*

In addition to ordinary tourists, Czechoslovakia has been soliciting visits from the Czech and Slovak emigres and their descendants in the West. In 1956, 30,000 "invitations" were sent to these so-called *krajani*, offering them a special currency rate more favorable than the tourist rate then in force. In 1957, according to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 13, 1958, 2,000 *krajani* came from US, 1,700 from Austria, and 400 from France.

Foreign travel to Czechoslovakia is handled by the State travel agency Cedok. In accordance with a prevailing bloc practice, tourist visas are issued only after the advance purchase of coupons covering all living expenses in Czechoslovakia, and are valid only for the number of days so "purchased" (a minimum of three days).\*\* At present, tourists are entitled to a currency exchange rate of 14.34 *koruny*-\$1, about double the official rate.

Cedok campaigns for tourists extensively in Western Europe and the US, by means of paid advertisements in the Western newspapers, and special promotions; for example, during the Brussels World's Fair, trips to Czechoslovakia in TU-104 jets were offered as contest prizes by two Belgian Communist papers.

\* This represented a slight decline from the previous year. According to *Hospodarske Noviny*, volume of Western tourists to Czechoslovakia was as follows: 1955, 2,749; 1956, 11,822; 1957, 28,528; 1958, 24,922. According to the Western press, about 6,000 Americans visited Czechoslovakia in 1958.

\*\* According to a prospectus just issued by a travel agency, prepaid coupons are now required to cover only one-fourth of the intended stay in Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia's main drawing card for vacationers are its 52 spas, including Karlovy Vary (Carlsbad), Mariánské Lázně (Marienbad) and other resorts of international renown before the war. In 1955, the spas had only 40 foreign visitors; in the first three-quarters of 1957, more than a thousand, from 31 different countries. (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], January 19, 1958.)

Game-hunting parties were specially promoted in 1958; regular events aimed in part at the tourist trade are the annual Prague Music Festival, the International Film Festival in Karlovy Vary, and the Spartacus Games (next scheduled for 1960).

In 1959 Cedok is offering private car rental and motels for foreign tourists, combination tours by bus to points in both Eastern and Western Europe, and further simplification of visa formalities.

Hotel space, as is the rule throughout the area, is extremely short, although Czechoslovak hotels seem to hold themselves superior to the general level in the Soviet bloc. Many of the old-fashioned luxury spa hotels have been refurbished and reopened.\* The recently-built International Hotel is one of Prague's showplaces, the tallest building in the city.\*\* Cedok operates 18 hotels in Prague and the resorts, and handles all foreign reservations in first class hotels throughout the country.

*Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), August 12, 1958, praised Czechoslovak hotels as the equal of any in the world, but criticized their high rates. The deluxe Cedok hotels, according to *Svobodne Slovo*, charge 70-120 *koruny* (\$10-\$17 at the official rate; tourist rate is half) per day, which is beyond the means of many tourists, particularly the emigre visitors. But the Cedok coupons sold abroad provide for only the most expensive accommodations.\*\*\*

The Czechoslovak authorities are quite matter-of-fact about their objectives in promoting tourism. *Vecerni Praha* (Prague), June 9, 1958, reported that the Foreign Trade Ministry had commended the State Bank branch at the Alcron Hotel (one of the leading hotels for foreigners in Prague) for its advance fulfillment of its "plan" to exchange one million *koruny* for foreign currencies, mainly dollars.

In its August 10, 1958, issue *Rude Pravo* noted the prevalence of foreign tongues—Russian, English, German, French, Italian, Arabic—in midtown Prague, which "elo-

quently refutes statements in the West about so-called Iron Curtains."\*\* The paper cited the favorable impressions allegedly gained by the visitors—full employment, the free medical services, the well-stocked shops—and concluded that never again would these foreign visitors "believe the hostile propaganda against us in their countries."

## Outgoing Traffic

The rising incoming tourist traffic in Czechoslovakia is paralleled by the increase in travel out of the country, according to regime reports. *Rude Pravo*, February 10, 1959, said that almost 90,000 Czechoslovak tourists went abroad in 1958\*\* (20.8 percent more than in 1957). Of this total, 82,610 visited "Socialist" countries (17 percent more than in 1957) and 6,000 non-Communist countries (102.2 percent more).

By contrast, only 4,000 Czechoslovak tourists had gone abroad in 1955, and only to "Socialist" countries; there was no travel from Czechoslovakia to the West.\*\*\*

According to *Svobodne Slovo*, January 7, 1959, the total will increase again by about 20,000 in 1959. 34,000 are scheduled to go to East Germany; 20,000 to Bulgaria, 13,000 to Romania. There will be three group tours to Red China.

This increase in volume is somewhat deceptive, for Czechoslovak travel abroad is strictly limited and closely supervised. Tourism is entirely under the aegis of Cedok, and consists almost entirely of conducted group excursions to fairs, sports events and cultural functions. There is virtually no private travel abroad, except for the purpose of visiting relatives. All travel arrangements with Cedok are made through the trade unions and mass organizations, which make the selections of applicants.

The regime also takes great pains to put travellers on their guard in the West. Experiences of Czechoslovak travellers who have been approached by "spies" and "agents" are regularly cited in the newspapers. *Prace* (Prague), October 26, 1957, carried one such story by a traveller who claimed that while visiting his mother in West Germany he had been questioned by a "NATO agent" about atomic installations in the Liberec region. The writer declared that the example of his own experience

\* Recently it was announced that some of the large luxury hotels in the Tatra and Krkonose Mountains formerly reserved for the exclusive use of foreigners had been opened to Czechoslovak tourists. Rates for a single room without board are 24-29 *koruny* per day (*Svobodne Slovo*, December 13, 1958). (Average industrial worker's wage: 1,300 *koruny* a month.)

\*\* Some of the Prague hotels seem to have escaped nationalization until quite recently. *Svobodne Slovo*, October 31, 1958, reported that the Prague Central National Committee had recommended that the State take over the Hotels Savoy, Adrian, Luna, Union, Tichy, Ametyst and Regina plus a number of the larger restaurants.


\*\*\* According to figures published in *Lidova Demokracie*, September 10, 1958, the average cost of a one-night stay in a municipal hotel (all classes) in Bratislava is 23.40 *koruny*; in Prague, only 20 *koruny*; and outside the major cities, 7.70 to 8.50 *koruny*. The paper said that there are altogether 2,107 tourist (foreign and domestic) lodgings with a total capacity of 73,521.

\* A small but telling reminder of the Stalin era of isolation and secrecy is the continuing lack of guidebooks and street maps available to the public. On November 29, 1958, *Prace* (Prague) complained on behalf of foreign tourists that neither the bookshops, stationery shops, or tourist offices were able to supply a plan of Prague. The only one available, according to the paper, was a Czech-language map in a foreign-language guidebook selling for 15.60 *koruny* (over \$2.00).

\*\* The largest number, 26,000, went to East Germany (an 8 percent decrease from 1957). The next largest group, almost 15,000, went to Hungary, constituting a 150 percent increase over 1957. Roughly 10,000 went to the USSR, 9,000 to Romania, 7,000 to Poland, 11,000 to Bulgaria, 2,700 to Yugoslavia (a 10 percent increase over 1957). 1,635 went to Austria, a 17 percent decrease from 1957. About 500 went to Albania, double the number in 1957. (*Rude Pravo*, February 10, 1959.)

\*\*\* According to the CSPC CC journal *Hospodarske Noviny*, March 13, 1959, tourists from Czechoslovakia to the West multiplied as follows: 1955, none; 1956, 1,174; 1957, 2,791; 1958, 6,033.





Two Polish spas: left, Rabka "famous for its salt waters and climate"; right, Krynica, "the pearl of Polish health resorts." Pictures illustrated an article in the English-language magazine *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1958, entitled "Is Poland an Attractive Country for Tourists?"

showed "what many of our citizens are faced with when travelling in capitalist countries." Recently these tourist adventures in West Germany have become incorporated in a general propaganda campaign against the German Federal Republic: among others, the January 25, 1959 issue of *Rude Pravo* listed a number of such cases in detail.

## Poland

WITHIN THE SOVIET bloc, Poland ranks alongside Czechoslovakia in appeal for Western tourists—but on entirely different grounds. Markedly and frankly deficient in material tourist comforts, it offers one attraction outstanding in the area: a relatively high degree of freedom and spontaneity.

Visitors from the West, by all accounts, receive a friendlier welcome and more opportunity for contact with the people and their ordinary life than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc. The popularity of Western tourists has, in fact, been something of an embarrassment to the Communist regime, which nonetheless also encourages them for badly needed foreign currencies.

Poland is presumably less attractive to tourists from other Soviet bloc countries (see box), because of its lack of facilities, but its lively theaters and cabarets are reportedly well patronized by visitors from drabber if more prosperous lands. Further, and more decisively, the other bloc regimes evince a certain reluctance to expose their citizens to the Polish example.\*

An estimated 123,000 foreign visitors came to Poland in 1958, 14 percent more than in 1957: 57,000 came from "Socialist" countries (including Yugoslavia and China); 41,508 came from outside. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], February 1, 1959; Radio Warsaw, April 21, 1959.) *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), December 9, 1959, said that most of the Western tourists were from the United States and Canada, and most travelled independently rather than on group tours. According to *7 Dni* (Warsaw), January 11, 1959, there were 10,000 visitors from the United States, as against 5,000 in 1957; the paper predicted that the number would eventually reach a level of 20-30,000 a year.

The State travel agency, Orbis, handles most of the foreign tourist business (according to *Trybuna Ludu*, July 3, 1958, Orbis has agreements with 48 travel agencies in the US and seven in Canada). During 1958 Orbis served more than 45,000 foreign tourists, of whom about 70 percent were from the West, and its foreign currency income from these countries amounted to \$1,800,000. (Radio Warsaw, February 3, 1959.)

Foreign tourists in Poland—as well as Polish tourists abroad—are inevitably affected by Poland's complex currency problems. After the October Revolution, the Polish regime established a special tourist rate of exchange of 24 *zloty* to the dollar. The rate on the illegal "free market" is about 125 to the dollar.

At the legal tourist rate, costs are said to be somewhat—though not exorbitantly—high. The Orbis coupons which

\* For example, Czechoslovakia is sending only 5,000 tourists to Poland this year; only Albania is allotted a smaller number. A far greater number of Czechoslovaks are scheduled (by regime tourist exchange agreements) to go to other bloc countries, particularly Bulgaria (23,000) and East Germany. The large numbers (over 50,000 in 1956-57) of Czechoslovak excursionists who cross over into the Polish side of the Tatra Mountains region without passport control (under a mutual arrangement with Poland) are presumably not accounted for in this announced allotment.

foreign tourists are obliged to buy as a condition of receiving visas cost from \$5-\$10 a day. Tourists report that hotel rooms are cheap by Western standards; restaurant meals and all forms of transportation in Poland are expensive.

### **Tourist Attractions — and Deterrents**

The main tourist centers in Poland are the resorts such as Sopot, on the Baltic Sea; the Mazurian Lakes district; Zakopane, in the south, which is fast regaining its place as an international ski center; the city of Cracow with its ancient University and Wawel Castle. First and foremost, however, is Warsaw, whose reconstructed Old City is considered one of the architectural marvels of Eastern Europe, as is also (in another sense) the Palace of Science and Culture, Stalin's "gift" to the Polish people.

The shortage of hotels in all these centers is critical. Indeed, the low state of Poland's hotels, restaurants, and transportation is regularly bemoaned in the press. According to *Trybuna Ludu*, December 7, 1958, Orbis has accommodations for only 1,500 foreign tourists in some 50 hotels, many of which are in an advanced state of disrepair. The recent opening of a new Orbis hotel in Warsaw, the Grand, supplementing the traditional foreigners' rendezvous, the Hotel Bristol, has somewhat alleviated the crisis. But "things reached the point where Cracow had to be cut out of tourist itineraries, because there was simply no place to spend the night," according to *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), December 9, 1958. And hotel facilities in the resorts are "[so] inadequate and outmoded [that] we have stopped advertising our resorts abroad, although there is no lack of potential customers."

In addition to the hotel shortages, the paper scored the lack of arrangements for tourist entertainment, pointing out that at the height of the tourist season all the theaters in Warsaw were closed and the popular song-and-dance troupes had gone on tour.

Orbis plans in 1959 to start construction on a large hotel in Cracow, renovate the existing hotels in Lodz, Wroclaw and Poznan, and draft blueprints for new hotels in Katowice and Poznan. To improve the service in tourist es-

tablishments, Orbis is conducting training courses for hotel and restaurant staffs and tour guides.

Automobile touring in Poland will be facilitated in 1959. Orbis will arrange for the rental of private cars in Poland and agencies abroad will sell special gasoline coupons for dollars.

Despite all the difficulties and shortages, Orbis is bidding for new markets in 1959, concentrating this year on attracting tourists from Scandinavia, Austria, Italy and South America.

A long-range program for the development of tourist facilities in the years 1959-1965 was outlined in *Trybuna Ludu*, December 31, 1958. The financial base will be a Tourist Development Fund, the yearly income of which (from passport fees, revenue of travel bureaus, etc.) will amount to an estimated 200 million *zloty*. The plan calls for tourist centers to be set up in nearly 400 resorts by the end of 1965. Hotels with a total capacity of 600,000 guests a year will be built in the towns most visited by foreigners: Warsaw, Cracow, Katowice, Szczecin, Wroclaw, Gdansk and Olsztyn.

### **Polish Tourists Abroad**

The eagerness of the Poles to break out of their isolation from the rest of Europe is well known. In 1956, 140,000 Poles took personal trips abroad;\* the number reached a peak of 177,000 in 1957, and fell off to 164,000 in 1958 (*Trybuna Ludu*, January 26, 1958 and Radio Warsaw, April 21, 1959.)

About twice as many Polish tourists go to Soviet bloc countries as go to non-Communist countries. In 1958 Orbis tours went to 13 foreign countries, predominantly to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and to Brussels for the World's Fair. Only one-sixth of the Polish tourists take part in the organized Orbis group tours, the majority apparently preferring to travel independently.

Cost appears to be the major problem now for Polish tourists. The Orbis tours have been severely criticized for, among other things, their high price (from 2,000 to 8,000 *zloty*.)\*\* According to *Zycie Warszawy*, October 14, 1958, the trade unions have trouble filling their quotas for these tours, and claim that the workers cannot afford them. *Zycie Warszawy* said that many of the factory councils, unable to find any takers, sell their tour allotments, sometimes even at a profit. The profits are deposited in the council treasury and the places on the tours go to those who can pay the fees. "On the basis of this, certain people may — indeed do — voice the suspicion that the majority (if not all) of those going abroad must have an illegal source of income," the paper observed.

According to both official and unofficial reports, a large number of Polish tourists try to finance their trips abroad by various forms of illicit trade. The Polish press has charged that at least half the Polish tourists going abroad

\* The Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated the number of Poles who went abroad on business or professional trips at 24,875 in 1956 and 32,502 in 1957. The number of business trips declined in 1958 by as much as 36.5 percent, according to this report. (*Trybuna Ludu*, December 6, 1958.)

\*\* Average industrial wage: 1,500 *zloty* monthly.

### **Soviet Tourists in Poland**

LARGE NUMBERS of Soviet tourists have recently expressed interest in going to Poland, according to travellers' reports. A Soviet technician was quoted as having explained to a Pole that "Warsaw is for us what Paris and Brussels are for you. Your films, your abstract painting, your poets, whose works are translated here sporadically; your fashion, which our women admire; your magazines, the dancing of the young people in night clubs, about which some of my colleagues who visited Warsaw and Cracow have told me; the atmosphere in the theaters and cabarets—all that is so different from what we have that it attracts our tourists, tempting them to go to Poland which is accessible while the real West remains closed."



Prague: Hradcany Castle (the old royal residence); the spires of St. Vitus Cathedral beyond. Prague, with its medieval and renaissance monuments, is accounted one of the most beautiful cities of Europe, and is a major attraction for tourists in the area.

Photo from *Praha ve Fotografii*, (Prague), 1953

are engaging in smuggling and black marketeering on some scale. Small items bought in the West, such as shoes, can be sold at a profit in Poland. Polish products such as dress fabrics, rugs, tapestries, command a high price in the Soviet Union, while Soviet items such as television sets, cameras, furs and watches can be sold in Poland. According to official statements, the bulk of smuggling into Poland is being done on trips to and from Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (particularly in the Tatra Mountain area which is bisected by the Czechoslovak-Polish border and by a recent agreement has been free from passport and customs control). Controls on the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian borders have recently been tightened.

An article in *Trybuna Ludu*, August 4, 1958, charged that the Orbis agency itself, by failing to arrange a comprehensive program of activities on its excursions, inadvertently facilitates these illegal financial activities. "Orbis trips are becoming less and less tourist excursions and more and more just a means of transporting a certain number of people to a foreign country and there turning them out to pasture (read, shops, etc.)," said the paper. "The Orbis programs are becoming more and more impoverished from year to year, as if purposely to provide the dealers and

speculators with as much time as possible to pursue their nefarious activities. The programs are arranged according to the motto: the less the better."

*Zycie Warszawy*, October 15, 1958, said that "not only are the Polish authorities fed up with the whole thing, but, according to a spokesman in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, foreign officials too are now openly protesting." The paper warned that foreign countries may refuse entrance visas to Polish excursionists if smuggling is not stopped. The same paper reported on December 9 that illegal trade and smuggling among tourists declined somewhat toward the end of 1958.

Along with the amateur smugglers, defectors to the West are the chief target of regime attacks on travel abuses. According to *Zycie Warszawy*, October 15, 1958, the percentage of defectors among tourists is about 3.5 percent (and, according to the paper, is constantly decreasing). The paper put the official view of these cases in strong terms:

"Sometimes it happens that a citizen going abroad at great expense and with a legal passport decides to remain there permanently. God go with him. But, these legal tourists demand political asylum; and though this is a lot

of nonsense, it brings no glory to Poland and great profit to certain political groups."

*Głos Pracy* (Warsaw) reported on January 10, 1959, that in the first ten months of 1958, 250,000 passports were issued to Polish citizens. "The Warsaw Passport Bureau," commented the paper, "now settles more cases in one hour than it did throughout the entire year of 1950." The number of passports is of course much higher than the number of tourists who went abroad. But as *Zycie Warszawy* wrote on October 12, 1958, "the matter of going abroad has become—and not only to those who actually make the trip—an essential expression of the political changes which have occurred during the past two years." According to the *Głos Pracy* report, only some 2 percent of passport applications are rejected. The main condition for going abroad is financial, not political, said *Głos Pracy*; in order to obtain a passport would-be travellers must produce proof that they possess the funds necessary to cover transportation expenses. Expenses paid for in foreign currencies are granted a special reduction.

The drop in the rate of tourist travel from Poland in 1958 can be attributed to a natural levelling off, but there is also evidence of a tightening of official policy. A new passport law which went into force at the beginning of 1959 stipulates that a passport can be withheld from an applicant who while abroad "acted or might act against the interests of the State or compromise the country's good name." The significance of this law will depend, of course, on how it is applied. Radio Warsaw, February 19, 1959, said that it was aimed primarily at smugglers and speculators.

It has recently been reported also that the regime is adopting a stricter attitude toward granting travel permissions and financial aid to Polish writers and intellectuals wishing to go abroad for study or other activities connected with their profession. The regime complains that much of this is really pleasure travel and will insist that such travellers stick to their professed objectives.

### Current Plans

According to *Trybuna Ludu*, January 25, 1959, over 15,000 Polish tourists are expected to take part in Orbis tours abroad this year. Of these, 13,000 will go to "Socialist" countries and a little over 2,000 to the West. The first tourist excursions from Poland to China (four 26-day tours) are scheduled. Organized tours will go for the first time to Romania and Albania. 9,000 Polish tourists will go to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and 1,500 Poles are expected to take part in tours to the Soviet Union.\* Orbis is also planning to run bus excursions to Yugoslavia,\*\*

\* *Trybuna Ludu* warned that the success of the three types of tours to the USSR (to Leningrad, to Moscow and to Sochi) may be jeopardized by their high price: 15,000 zloty. Poland and the USSR have made an agreement for a limited tourist exchange involving no exchange of currency. The approximate costs of a three to four week tour from Poland to the Soviet Union under this agreement comes to approximately 3,500 zloty. 900 Polish tourists and 750 students are included in the agreement.

\*\* "Negotiations with Yugoslavia will make possible the departure next year of a larger group of Polish tourists—maybe," said the March 4, 1958, issue of *Trybuna Ludu*, with an eye to the political situation.



A beach on the Black Sea, in Varna, Bulgaria. The Bulgarian seaside has become a resort playground for the regime elite of the entire Soviet bloc.

Photo from *Bulgaria* (Sofia), No. 6, 1957

which will include a stop in Vienna, and to Austria and Italy.

### Student Travel

Student trips abroad are organized not by Orbis but by the regime-run Polish Students' Association (ZSP). According to *Trybuna Ludu*, November 13, 1958, the ZSP's Travel Bureau sent more than 3,500 students abroad during the 1958 vacation season. The majority of these trips were purely recreational, although some involved studies. More than 500 students worked at International Work Camps abroad. A new form of excursion was "Around Europe" conducted tours in which 150 students took part. A large number visited the Brussels Fair.

"Not only did the number of those going abroad increase, but also the number of countries they visited," said *Trybuna Ludu*. "These facts completely discredit the statements of various Western radio stations which spread lies that there has been some sort of curtailment in student tourist travel. Furthermore, the financial conditions of these trips are frequently much more propitious to Polish students than anything available to their Western counterparts." A two-week tour of Western Europe costs the student 1,500 zloty and a nine-day Moscow-Leningrad excursion 900 zloty, with the balance paid by the ZSP. "Both the State and the student organization provide considerable financial aid to help Polish students spend their vacations abroad," the paper asserted.



2500 students from 26 countries visited Poland as tourists in 1958. They were quartered in camps and special student-run hostels opened in eight academic centers. A part of the foreign currency derived from their visits will be turned over to the ZSP Travel Bureau to finance Polish students' trips abroad.

Student travel was to be expanded in 1959, the increase being mainly in the exchange of students with the other "Socialist" countries. To date agreements have been signed with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, involving a total of 800 students.

Possibilities for Western Europe depend on Poland's foreign currency position, but it is expected that some 300 students will go to Western Europe as tourists. During an international conference of Western Student Union Travel Bureaus, held in Amsterdam, interest in exchanging students with Poland was shown—in addition to the traditional partners, such as France—by Holland, Norway, and Great Britain. About 100 Polish students will go on special ZSP tours to the July Youth Festival in Vienna.

Also in 1959, foreign students en route to other Soviet bloc countries are to stop over in Poland, including a group of 300 American students going to the Soviet Union. (*Trybuna Ludu*, November 13, 1958.)

## Bulgaria

ALL SIGNS POINT to Bulgaria as the professional playground of the Soviet bloc, eager to propagate and live up to its unofficial title of the "East European Riviera." Under present plans (believed to be part of an areawide integrated economic program), tourism will become a leading contributor to the Bulgarian economy. By 1962 it is expected to account for at least 30 percent of the country's foreign trade revenue.

At the Seventh Bulgarian Party Congress in June 1958, Premier Anton Yugov pointed out that in the Third Five Year Plan (1958-1962), 170 million *leva* have been allocated to resort, hotel and highway development. The State income from new resort constructions alone should reach 20 million *leva* in foreign currency by 1962, Yugov said.

The tourist mecca in Bulgaria is its beach resorts on the Black Sea. The regime is expanding Varna and Zlatni Piasati, and constructing several new centers.\* The resorts are, by and large, self-contained communities, with deluxe hotels, restaurants and cafes, modern beach bungalow colonies, and gambling casinos featuring roulette, card games, and slot machines. This plush strip of the Black Sea coast appears to have become the favorite vacation spot for top-ranking Communists from throughout the Soviet bloc. In 1958, the Premiers of Czechoslovakia (Siroky), Hungary (Munnich), and Albania (Shehu), several members of the Czechoslovakia Party Presidium, and officials from various Soviet "Republics" were reported visiting Varna.

\* A wholly new resort called Slunchev Briag, (Sunny Shore) near Nessebar, was scheduled to open to tourists on June 1. It has 31 hotels and 120 bungalows, with 3,000 beds. In Zlatni Piasati, near Varna, 17 hotels with 3,000 beds, and 500 bungalows, have been built up.

The Varna newspaper *Narodna Delo* reported on April 12, 1959, that the resort had 22,000 foreign and 84,000 Bulgarian visitors in 1958, and 50,000 foreign and 100,000 Bulgarian tourists are expected there this year.

In 1957, about 30,000 foreign tourists—as compared to 3,000 in 1955—visited Bulgaria, and spent 25 million *leva* in foreign currency. (*Otechestven Front* [Sofia], December 29, 1957.) At a press conference held last May in Sofia, it was reported that 95,000 tourists came in 1958, and that under 1959 tourist exchange agreements, 60,000 vacationers will come from other Soviet bloc countries. This includes 23,000 from Czechoslovakia, 20,000 from East Germany, 9,000 from Poland, 5,000 from the Soviet Union, and others. From the free world, about 5,000 tourists are expected from France, Austria, England and Scandinavia. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], May 16, 1959.)

Virtually all of Bulgaria's tourists are from within the Soviet bloc, but the regime aspires to attract Western visitors (and their hard currencies). Indeed, this was believed to be one of the chief motives behind the persistent efforts of the Bulgarian regime to restore diplomatic relations with the United States. Diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the U.S. were resumed in March 1959, after a nine-year break, and the lifting of US travel restrictions followed in May.

To attract visitors from outside the bloc, a 40 percent discount on currency exchange was introduced by the Bulgarian regime in July 1957. With this premium, American tourists would receive 9.50 *leva* per dollar (the official rate being 6.80 *leva* to \$1). The State travel agency Balkantourist also offers other advantageous discounts, such as 50 percent off on gasoline and on railroad and boat fares for large groups.

Rates for hotel rooms and board are unofficially reported to range from \$4.50 to \$6.50 a day. Also unofficially, it is reported that foreign tourists' movements in Bulgaria are considerably circumscribed; police permission is still required for tourists to depart from their prearranged itinerary.

## Bulgarians Travelling Abroad

Balkantourist group excursions inside the Soviet bloc are the only form of foreign travel generally available to Bulgarian citizens.

In contrast to the estimated 95,000 foreign tourists entering the country, only some 6,000 Bulgarian tourists travelled abroad in 1958. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, July 4, 1958.) 2,000 of these went to the Soviet Union under an exchange agreement which waived passport formalities on both sides and, in addition to the usual conducted tours, permitted individual private travel between the two countries for the first time.

## Romania

TRAVEL TO ROMANIA is a cumbersome undertaking. For Westerners, it is almost prohibitively expensive, even at the special tourist currency rate of 12 *lei*-\$1 (official rate 6.80-\$1). The prepaid coupons, obligatory for those acquiring tourist visas, amount to \$30 per day. Applications

for visas and travel reservations must be made eight weeks in advance. While holders of tourist visas may enter Romania by any route and mode of transportation, those with visitors' visas (issued to persons visiting relatives in Romania) are required to enter the country in groups and by airplane.

Package tours conducted by the State travel agency Carpati are still the rule for all tourist travel, but private automobile travel is supposed to be facilitated this year. (*Romania Libera* [Bucharest], January 10, 1959.)


Foreign tourism in Romania has grown along with the general areawide trend. Radio Bucharest said on November 20, 1958, that so far that year Romania had accommodated twice as many foreign tourists as in 1957, and the number is expected to double again in 1959. *Scinteia* (Bucharest), October 26, 1958, reported a daily average of 2,500 foreigners present in Romania during the summer of 1958.

The main tourist centers in Romania are Bucharest, the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea resorts. Last summer, eight game-hunting centers were being readied for foreigners. (*Scinteia*, August 28, 1958). Also last year,

the Danube Delta, well-known in prewar years for its exotic wildlife, was reopened to visitors. Over 7,000 tourists from various countries have reportedly signed up for excursions to the Delta in 1959.

Simultaneous with an intensified drive against the Church (predominantly Orthodox) and persecution of its priests and followers, the Romanian regime has ordered a face-lifting of all important churches and monasteries, for which purpose a sum of over 30 million *lei* was reportedly allocated in 1959. The object is apparently to exploit these buildings as sightseeing attractions, and they are so featured in the pamphlets and literature being put out by the State tourist office.

The other aspect of Romania's restrictive travel policy applies to foreign travel for Romanians. This is in practice limited to group excursions to sports and arts festivals inside the Soviet bloc, and cruises for privileged groups on the Romanian luxury ship *Transylvania*, which also takes groups from other Soviet bloc countries and elsewhere on Mediterranean and Black Sea trips. A prime deterrent to all travel for ordinary Romanian citizens is expense; few have the means to travel on their own.



A concert held in the Zbraslav Gallery on the outskirts of Prague during the Czechoslovak capital's annual Music Festival, an important attraction for foreign tourists.

Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), May 30, 1959



# Not So Fast, Comrades, Not So Fast

*Last year, as part of their "leap forward," the Chinese Communists announced the launching of a program for a direct and immediate transition to Communism. Claiming that their newly-constituted communes formed an organizational nucleus for this advance, they began talking of implementing the Marxist ideal of "to each according to his need." The Soviets did not follow suit and for many months did not publicize the Chinese claims. In December, the Chinese backed down. The following from Radio Moscow, March 23, 1959, is a frank explanation of Soviet attitudes on this question of Communist theory and practice and reveals their stress on material incentives.*

IN HIS REPORT to the Congress, N. S. Khrushchev criticized those people who wanted the earliest introduction of the Communist principle of distribution, and those who advocated the leveling of distribution. What would happen if we now attempted to effect the transition to distribution not according to one's work, but according to one's needs?

"In the first place, with the present level of production, we would run short of material wealth if we tried to satisfy the needs of all members of society. And if, contrary to all common sense, we introduced the Communist principle of distribution . . . society would quickly consume all its material wealth accumulated over many years, and secondly, the working people would not have the material stimulus for raising labor productivity. . . .

"The leveling principle of distribution is put into effect when material wealth produced is divided equally among all those participating in production. This type of distribution existed at the earliest stages of human society. Prehistoric man produced so little that if some members of the community received more than others, these others would have starved.

"There was a period of War Communism in our country when we had to depart temporarily from the principle of distribution according to one's work and accept the principle of equal distribution. This measure was dictated by the acute shortage of food and industrial articles . . . . However, to introduce the system as a permanent and normal measure during Socialism is wrong, unjustifiable and impermissible.

"Distribution according to one's work is the economic law of Socialism. This law stipulates that the distribution of goods produced should be directly proportional to the quantity and quality of work by each working person, [taking into consideration] the necessity of equal pay for equal labor. From this law it follows that a resolute struggle must be waged against equal pay for work when there has been no consideration of its quality and quantity, the skill of the worker and his labor productivity. The principle of [equal] distribution . . . is a petty bourgeois slogan. It expresses the petty bourgeois concept of Socialism as a general leveling in the sphere of consumption, living conditions, tastes and needs.

"Certain comrades allege that distribution according to one's work contradicts the principle of equality for which the working class has been struggling. This is wrong. . . . Does equality exist under Socialism? Naturally it does. Here we have in mind not only the political equality of Soviet citizens. . . . [Equality] means the liquidation of private ownership of the means of production, equal access to work with communally owned means of production, the duty to work as well as to obtain material wealth according to one's work, which is equally applicable to all.

"The Socialist principle of distribution means the application of an equal, legal yardstick to all working people. Such a unified yardstick is work. Under Socialism, class inequality is eliminated. The only inequality that remains is the small differences in the amounts of goods that are distributed. Such differences in amounts distributed are determined by the quality and quantity of the work of every member of society. . . .

"Socialism demands a method of distribution subordinate to the interests of production. The development of production, Engels wrote, is best stimulated by a method of distribution that makes it possible for all members of society comprehensively to develop, maintain, and express their ability. . . .

"The most important principle which follows from the very nature of the Socialist method of distribution is that of material incentive. . . . It is only idlers who benefit from equal distribution. It kills the stimulus for the raising of labor productivity. . . . At all stages of Socialist construction, the Communist Party has waged a struggle against the principle of equal distribution. Many Party documents have exposed its reactionary nature. At present, too, the Party is irreconcilably opposed to the system.

"The Socialist principle of distribution according to work presupposes that the living standard of workers and office workers under Socialism is determined not by individually earned wages alone. Wages and salaries are, according to Marx, individual shares . . . paid to the producers taking part in socially useful labor. These individual wages and salaries are augmented by large social and cultural funds, that is, funds created by the Socialist State, and used for education, medical services, social insurance. During intensive Communist construction, the role of public funds in improving the people's living standards will increase in importance. . . . The State's share of expenditure in the budget of a family amounts to nearly one-third of all income of the population. Naturally, the lower the wages or salaries, the greater the share of the public contribution to the family's budget. . . .

"At the same time, it is essential to emphasize that a growth in State expenditure for [such] purposes is by no means in accordance with the principle of petty bourgeois leveling. . . . This expenditure constitutes the most consistent implementation of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the equality of the working people in contrast to petty bourgeois equality."

# China Through Yugoslav Eyes

*Despite the increasing acerbity in the feud between Peiping and Belgrade, Yugoslavia has managed to maintain foreign correspondents in China. Their regular reports on conditions in the most Stalinist of all Soviet-bloc countries have been consistently informative. Written from a Marxist point of view, these items often decipher the mumbo-jumbo of Party propaganda to lay bare theoretical absurdities and the tragic human reality they camouflage. Though the authors describe conditions specifically Chinese, a great deal of this material bears some resemblance to what is now taking place in Eastern Europe. The economics of the "great leap," the automation of the intellect, the spurious fight against bureaucracy, the stress on physical labor, and various aspects of repression, all apply to present-day life in Bulgaria; they also exist, though in milder form, in the other countries. But above all China today, as much if not more than the Soviet Union, leads the way and points to things to come in the Soviet orbit. (An earlier series of reports appeared in East Europe, Nov. 1958.)*



"Bringing fertilizer to cotton land meticulously levelled to ensure even irrigation, Ankuo county, Hopeh province."

*China Reconstructs (Peiping), April 1959*

## A Factory of Writers

"EVERYBODY WRITES" is the name of a campaign launched a few months ago in China, and the people are writing. Workers, peasants, functionaries, soldiers, students, officials of all ranks, especially Party officials, are writing and setting an example. They are writing songs, poems, articles, reviews, plays, memoirs, scenarios. . . . Everybody is writing, and the amount that has been written is fantastic.

Let us take only one example, quoted by the Peiping Trade Union paper:

In the Kusyen iron works, in Shansi Province, one Thursday was set aside as a free day when all employees and workers had to sit down and write something. On that day alone, twelve thousand people in the factory wrote—over 160,000 articles, short stories, poems and essays!

"The campaign . . ." the paper comments, "helps the working people increase their ability to think and write, and in this way contributes to the gradual liquidation of barriers between mental and physical work."

Djordje Bogojevic, from Peiping, *Borba* (Belgrade), February 22, 1959.

## Steel and Profits

"THE ALL-NATIONAL campaign for casting steel" took place during the last four months of last year. According to official data, over fifty million people took part in this campaign, and dug ore and coal, made coke, built small, old-fashioned furnaces, and smelted iron and steel by primitive methods. But let us assume that they did not work at this for the entire four months period—that every man worked only an average of one month. This amounts to a billion and a half working days.

According to official data, about 2.5 million metric tons of steel were cast by traditional methods—i.e., about two and one half billion kilograms. . . . It thus appears that every participant in the campaign manufactured daily at best two kilograms of steel.

A ton of good quality steel costs about eighty dollars on the world market. Steel manufactured in a primitive way is obviously of poorer quality and may cost at most seventy dollars a ton. This amounts to seven cents for one kilogram. It means that the average actual value of steel produced by each of those fifty million people in one day amounted to only fourteen cents (and had we assumed that all these fifty million people worked for the whole four months, the sum would be far smaller.) Fourteen cents! Each worker's daily food (had the State paid for it) would have had to cost that much, let alone other production costs, and production required very tedious uninterrupted work. . . .

Furnaces were built in streets . . . in yards of enterprises, institutions, schools, hotels. People worked day and night. And this certainly tended to disturb the routine of various enterprises and institutions. . . . Furnaces for smelting iron and steel were built everywhere—regardless of com-

munications, regardless of the distance from the source of raw materials. Yet, as all furnaces had to work . . . enormous quantities of ore, coal, coke and metal scrap had to be transported. And suddenly, there appeared the bottleneck: transportation. . . . All transportation means, ranging from planes, trains, to junks and rickshaws were placed at the service of steel. And then, of course . . . serious disturbances arose in the supply to the market. . . .

Can such a method of increasing production . . . be permanently used?

It seems clear even to the Chinese that it cannot. According to official announcements, mass action and primitive methods . . . will not be completely abandoned this year, but the aim is to reduce them to sensible proportions and to combine foreign and domestic methods. This . . . only confirms the impression that what was done last year was done primarily for the purpose of political propaganda. . . . It is obvious that profitability will be taken into account this year, but it is equally clear that this will require even greater efforts from the people who are to take part in steel production. The example of the coal mine "Sin J" in Shansi Province . . . which was to raise coal output from 600 to 2,220 tons daily and to treble coal output . . . all without increasing the number of workers, clearly shows what efforts will be required. . . .

Djordje Bogojevic, from Peiping, *Borba* (Belgrade), March 1, 1959.

## Intellectuals Can't Crow

A CAPABLE OFFICIAL went to the emperor to seek employment in the palace. To help his case, he presented the emperor with an expensive fur. But the emperor's right-hand man, fearing a competitor, accused the official of being an impostor. The emperor got angry and condemned the official to death. . . . The wretched man begged the emperor's favorite paramour to persuade the emperor to release him. The paramour agreed, but on condition that she receive the same kind of fur the emperor had been given. The official, however, had no other fur.

The official's servant was there. He was a simple, uneducated man, but adept at finding his way in the world. He managed to steal the fur from the emperor and take it to the paramour. She kept her promise and helped the official to escape from prison. But it was night. The town gates were still closed, and it was impossible to leave. The official was desperate. He would have to wait until the cocks began to crow for the gates to be opened, but by then it would be dawn and he would be caught.

The servant came to his aid. Imitating a cock, he began to crow, so that the guards opened the gate and the official escaped.

This is an old Chinese story, and the fact that it is now on the pages of *Jen Min Jih Pao* has special meaning; because the moral of the story is: the key to true knowledge and how to live is held not by intellectuals but ordinary people.

Djordje Bogojevic, from Peiping, *Borba* (Belgrade), February 22, 1959.

## Food Shortage

PEOPLE WHO HAVE LIVED in Peiping for a long time claim that there have never been such irregularities and deficiencies in supplies to the capital, particularly in respect to foodstuffs. . . . Some of the basic foodstuffs (rice, flour, meat, oil, etc.) are strictly rationed. This includes sweet potatoes, which previously could be bought freely in the streets, and vegetables which, in addition to rice, are the basic food of the Chinese people. When Chinese citizens go to market, they are perplexed by the poverty of choice and supply. . . . Of course, you will see on all sides long queues of housewives waiting patiently to buy some food. . . .

Why should this happen just now, in the year of the "great stride" in agriculture? . . .

Last year's "nationwide campaign" for casting iron and steel mobilized more than 50 million people, mainly peasants. That same campaign absorbed all existing transport vehicles, [a fact] inevitably followed by setbacks . . . in the supply system. And so we arrive at that missing link between steel and cabbage. . . .

Other tens of millions of peasants were sent to work on irrigation projects. . . . The remaining ones were given the primary task of directing their efforts to expanding other branches of agriculture . . . so as to achieve the most brilliant successes. . . . Thus, naturally, not enough manpower remained, and the production of "small commodities," such as vegetables, was neglected.

This, however, does not mean that they were not produced. . . . [However] throughout the period from the setting up of the communes last summer . . . to the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee in December, official policy was that the communes should not produce commodities for the market, but only those which would meet their own needs, and that the commodities which they produced should not be sold on the market but distributed directly to consumers. The harmful effects of that policy soon became apparent, and the Plenum . . . had to work out a new, entirely different policy. The effects of the first policy, however, could not be erased overnight. . . . Communes, particularly those in the vicinity of towns, have now been assigned the urgent task of seeing to it that the plan for supplying towns with vegetables is fulfilled. . . .

Djordje Bogojevic, from Peiping, *Borba* (Belgrade, March 3, 1959).

## Metamorphosis of Intellectuals

CAMPAIGNS FOR RE-EDUCATING . . . intellectuals through physical work have been conducted for the last few years and their number is no longer known. One knows even less the number of those hundreds of thousands and millions of people who went through this purgatory and who . . . doffed their "bourgeois carapace" to be transformed into worthy citizens of the new Chinese society. Have these millions really . . . discarded everything that is contrary to the new moral and political norms, have they quite sincerely given "their hearts to the Party" . . . and actually adopted the Party line on the so-called transfor-

mation of intellectuals . . . i.e., that every intellectual should be first of all "a simple worker"?

These problems recently were discussed editorially in a Peiping paper. To the direct question: "Can it be said that after all actions and campaigns Chinese students today have a proper attitude . . . towards physical work?" the editor replies categorically no. . . . "There are still many students and young people in China who are willing to do everything in words, who gladly say that physical work is a 'glorious thing,' but who, when they themselves are involved, not only balk [at physical work] . . . but persistently oppose . . . the Party's postulate that 'they have to be first of all simple workers.'"

The editorial stressed that . . . the students usually say: Is it not an "enormous sin" and waste . . . to demand that I, a citizen with a university degree, pull a cart all my life? Will I not give more to my country as an intellectual than as a physical worker? . . .

A Peiping student tried to explain in the press why, in his opinion, intellectuals should not be too much engaged in physical work. . . . The chief idea this student wanted to express was that . . . in human society there will always have to be people who deal more with questions of theory than of practice, and vice versa. In Communism, too, there probably will have to be differences between intellectual and physical work. Not differences in the sense of greater or smaller worth . . . but in the sense of the division [of labor] and the most expedient organization. . . . Accordingly, the student writes . . . there can be more harm than good in having . . . intellectuals engaged intensively in physical work. . . .

There have been a number of censoring replies, including the above-mentioned editorial, sharply condemning this and other concepts prevalent among young . . . people. It is clear what such people want, one of the replies says. They would like to have a monopoly on knowledge and deprive the working people of the possibility of mastering



"Members of the 'Dawn' Commune in Koyang county dig a new channel." *China Reconstructs* (Peiping), February 1959





## Housewives Build Their Own Factories



These pictures and headline appeared in the English-language propaganda magazine *China Reconstructs* (Peiping), February 1959, from a story on factories run by women participating in the "great leap forward." Caption on the left: "'A month ago I was a housewife,' said 30-year-old Chu Shou-jung (left). With an instructor she is learning to become a skilled grinder making parts for electric motors at a satellite factory run by women for the Shihchiachuang Power Plant." Caption right: "Charging the furnace for the first heat. Smelting iron became one of the major tasks of the women's factories following the nationwide drive for more steel."

science. This is the ideology of the exploiting classes, another person states. . . .

Branko Bogunovic, from Peiping, *Politika* (Belgrade), March 5, 1959.

### Is He Really Cured?

LAST SPRING, more than a million intellectuals from Party organizations, State institutions, enterprises and schools were sent to work with peasants and workers, or to lower organs of local administration. . . . Now, one year later, the majority have returned to their old jobs.

Why were they sent?

There were a heap of reasons. The official and oft-repeated slogan was that they . . . had to be "re-educated and hardened." Another reason was that they had to be cured of "three evils"—bureaucracy, sectarianism and subjectivism. They also went to be cured of another five evils—red-tapism, laziness, conceit, a desire for luxury, and effeminacy. They went to free themselves of "the old feudal and bourgeois concept that educated people were the salt of the earth." They went because "they found it difficult to understand the thoughts and emotions of peasants and workers," and to learn "to share in their joys and sorrows." . . . And so on. It is really amazing how many negative qualities accumulated among the Party's cadres and senior civil servants.

To put it briefly: manual work was proclaimed an "excellent method" of curing bureaucrats and bureaucracy.

Now, as the bureaucrats are returning, the papers are full of flattering tributes to the healing effects of the meth-

od. . . . It is stressed particularly that it contributed to establishing "closer links" between the leadership "at the summit" and local leaders and ordinary people. . . .

Recently *Jen Min Jih Pao* published installments from a diary of one of the leaders who had been dispatched to the countryside. . . . In his diary, he says:

He went to a village, began working with the peasants on the land. The first day, an old peasant looked at him dubiously, wondering whether he would be able to do the work. But, by the next day, the peasant sighed with relief: the Party leader had mastered the work technique, and differed in no way from other peasants.

Several days later, the official . . . found that much better results could be obtained if the work was organized differently. He began introducing new work methods in his group and was successful. Then the other groups adopted his methods, and thus the entire commune improved its work. He was then elected to represent the commune at the district conference of producers. . . . The entire district adopted his methods.

When he returned to "his" village, he soon became one of its most beloved and respected men. He describes how people acquired the habit of coming to him with their cares and worries . . . asking him for advice and help.

The Party leader, author of the diary, does not suffer from any undue modesty. . . . But, in any case, this is not the important thing, although it is one of those "evils" that should have been cured. There is something more important:

The text of that diary (published by the leading Party

paper, probably meant as praise and as an example!) clearly shows that the leader . . . had gone "down to the lower ranks" . . . as a leader, that he behaved there as a leader, and that . . . he returned from there as a leader!

To become an expert in land cultivation was no trouble at all to him. The poor peasants who had spent their lives working on the land as well as the local commune leaders were simply unable to organize their work better . . . but it was *he*, the leader . . . who lost no time in finding the best possible work methods. . . . Since he gained fame and respect, the peasants elected *him* to be their representative to the district. There again, *he* was able to explain how work should be organized and *his* innovations spread everywhere. Finally, the peasants did not go to their Party Secretary or to the head of the commune for advice, and help, but to *him*, and this probably should serve as proof that the masses placed their utmost trust in the "higher leadership." . . .

It might of course be natural to raise a pertinent question. Did not the leader, who was sent to perform manual labor because of his bureaucratic habits . . . return even fuller of himself . . . even more conscious of his superior qualities in comparison with ordinary working people? He was able to verify on the spot that the peasants . . . hardly could have made any progress without his help! Will not that leader now become even more certain that he has been chosen to be a teacher of the masses, and to govern them? . . . The tone and contents of what he has written leave absolutely no doubt that he will.

Djordje Bogojevic, from Peiping, *Borba* (Belgrade), March 8, 1959.

## The Need for Mechanization

THE WIDE USE of heavy physical and manual labor in the Chinese economy, as well as the low productivity which results from this, are problems, as the Peiping press writes, demanding urgent solution if fulfillment of the extensive tasks of the 1959 plan is to be secured. According to the press, the city of Shanghai, the largest and most modern Chinese industrial center, used ordinary labor . . . for 37 percent of all operations in the city's industry, semi-mechanized operations for 36 percent, while fully mechanized methods are used for only 27 percent. . . . It is also stressed that 18 percent of all workers in Peiping industry are still engaged in heavy physical labor. . . . In the well-known Peiping iron works "Shih Ching Shan," laborers engaged in heavy physical tasks amount to 38 percent of the workers, while [ordinary] manual workers total over 60 percent of all workers employed in the iron works. . . .

Demands for limiting and eliminating heavy physical labor and introducing new techniques . . . are heard more and more frequently in the Peiping press . . . in connection with this year's State plan requiring a 55 percent increase over last year's volume of industrial production. And these extensive demands, as underlined in a report from Shanghai, cannot be realized if the present organization and mechanization of work is applied and if, for example, technological operations which will increase productivity by at least 40 to



"A Shensi peasant recites verses of his own composition to his grandson who takes them down."

*China Reconstructs* (Peiping), April 1959

50 percent are not introduced into Shanghai industry. . . .  
*Tanyug* from Peiping, *Politika*, March 11, 1959.

## Synchronized Heart Beats

IN THE PEIPING PARTY organ *Jen Min Jih Pao*, a discussion was recently conducted on the question of whether a member of the CP of China may have personal ambitions in life and, if he may, what such ambitions and aspirations should be. In an article winding up the discussion . . . the paper outlined the official Party stand. . . . The article says that the discussion had the character of debate . . . and expressed "most clearly" two opposing views. . . . One of them, the article says, is individualistic and bourgeois; this is the stand taken by Party member Chiang Chia-yen. Chiang Chia-yen, and others like him . . . propagated their views in the name of "emancipation of thought in a true Communist sense," of "independence of personality," and the right to have personal ambitions . . . placing their personal and individual aspirations above the nature and needs of the Party. . . .

At the same time, they preached against the Party's stand that all members should be an instrument in the hands of the Party and that . . . they should be an "obedient and submissive instrument." They even went to such lengths . . . that they insulted the most loyal and obedient Party members . . . describing them as . . . "limited mediocrities," people "who have no head or brains of their own," people "who have no ambitions," etc. Those who upheld such views, the article points out, were in fact launching a fierce attack against the Party as a whole, and were doing so again in order to make the Western wind prevail over the Eastern wind, to hoist the white flag instead of the red. . . .

The article stresses that a loyal and faithful Party member must "love all that the Party loves, and hate all that the Party hates." He must treat all the Party's worries as his own personal worries, and the Party's happiness as his





Peiping: "Women taking scraps to a collecting station—part of the drive to make steel."

*China Reconstructs* (Peiping), February 1959

own personal happiness . . . and all the "throbs of his heart must keep pace with the throbs of the Party's heart." In other words, the article goes on to say, a Party member, as a human being, should become an "all-embracing and perfect instrument" which the Party will be able to use in the best possible and easiest way. "That is, in fact, the basic difference between us and bourgeois individualists; for them it is shameful to subordinate themselves to full control by the Party . . . whereas for us to do so is a question of the highest honor and glory". . . .

The best criterion of the value and correctness of personal ambitions and aspirations of members of the Chinese CP is whether these personal desires . . . coincide in their entirety with the general course outlined by the Party. Only that which is in full agreement with that course can be regarded as progressive and permissible personal aspiration. . . .

For example, referring to the problem of job distribution . . . the article says that personal desires . . . should be "heard" and taken into consideration, but the most important and decisive factor . . . on appointments . . . should be sought in the Party's needs. . . .

These are the limits within which personal aspirations of . . . members of the Chinese CP may develop.

Branko Bogunovic, from Peiping, *Politika* (Belgrade), March 12, 1959.

### The Laws of Campaigns

THE MAIN PARTY ORGAN *Jen Min Jih Pao* announced that a number of economic enterprises in China had been shut down. Despite all the planning . . . despite the highest degree of centralism and Party leadership . . . a certain number of factories in the Chou Chi district, Chekiang Province, have been shut down due to the "insufficient supply of raw materials" and the generally "poor conditions for production." *Jen Min Jih Pao* published this news in connection with popularizing measures taken in the cam-

paign for liberating labor for sowing, so that the fact that some enterprises were closed appeared to be a good thing. It never occurred to anyone in the Party organ to draw conclusions from this fact about the non-Socialist character of an economy in which such things occur.

But this difference in criteria is no longer a novelty. . . . What attracts attention in the quoted case is the fact that the shutdowns are . . . a result of the very economic and political system now prevailing in this country. One of the basic axioms of the system is . . . that all major problems are solved by means of . . . mass national campaigns. . . .

For the time being the most important task is spring sowing, and as the labor forces in China are already overburdened, and since there are still many great and uncompleted campaigns, new forces had to be found in and transferred from the already existing campaigns. . . . There had to be a new campaign started to secure labor for sowing and this resulted in the fact that factories and enterprises born of the logic and laws of a [previous] campaign disappeared from the face of the earth only a few months later because of the very same laws.

In Hunan Province, for instance, work has been cancelled . . . in 25 . . . irrigation projects in one district. These projects began in the full swing of a previous national campaign . . . for irrigation, in which . . . about one hundred million people dug dams and canals for about one hundred days. By suspending further work on the 25 projects . . . about 800,000 people are now available, and the Peiping press called this a most decisive and positive fact. . . .

Reports from Szechwan Province are written in the same style and tone. In addition to other measures, all agricultural projects have been discontinued in the sowing campaign. This action surely released tens of thousands of new workers for sowing, but the result of a previous campaign whose "main line" had been in quite an opposite direction, have been "buried." This previous campaign (in force less than three months) . . . was for the development of auxiliary agricultural activities—gardening, poultry breeding, various crafts, etc.—to rectify sundry mistakes made in previous campaigns for steel, coal, rice and wheat.

Similar reports on the latest campaign . . . from other parts of China [indicate] . . . that the solution of existing problems by means of campaigns is the basic law of life in China. One of the inevitable results of this "law" is to create dislocations in many branches of life which are not "along the main line." But the existing mechanism acts inexorably, and one campaign follows another, regardless of all the . . . lessons of the preceding one. . . .

Branko Bogunovic, from Peiping, *Politika* (Belgrade), March 21, 1959.

### What's Cooking?

UNLIKE LAST YEAR, when officials performed physical labor mostly on a mass scale, the practice this year is being carried out more systematically. Plans have been elaborated and everything is being done according to a system of rotation. . . .

Lately it has been stressed that a considerable number of these officials fortify their abilities while working in public canteens, kitchens, homes for the aged, nurseries and other institutions within communes.

The kitchens are particularly important.

According to reports from the Kiangsi Province, 594 officials worked for one month as cooks or peasants. . . .

Everyone knows that it is not easy to be a cook. Of course, it is true that a person does not need particular talent for this job, but he must have some essential knowledge of the work. In China, however, they are of the opinion that Party Secretaries are masters of everything. . . .

The First Secretary of the Party Committee of the town of Si Nin . . . went to a commune and became a cook. . . . He not only knows how to prepare meals, but he also . . . examines and "tries all sorts of methods for economizing in food" and "solves problems connected with the management of the canteen." . . .

More and more frequently of late, the major Chinese papers have carried articles on the indispensability of economizing in food and controlling the consumption of food-stuffs, particularly grain; they say that energetic measures must be taken to limit consumption.

In the Chen Min commune, Hopeh Province, they have prescribed how much food each individual of a certain age should have in the course of a year, and . . . have introduced ration cards guaranteeing that no one will eat more than he is entitled to. To economize as efficiently as possible, they have gone even further; the masses allegedly decided on their own that in winter and also whenever there was less and easier work, two meals . . . would be sufficient and that the food itself need not be particularly nourishing or good. . . . In the course of only two months this winter more than 180,000 kilograms of food were thus saved, which certainly would have been consumed otherwise in a non-planned system.

Djordje Bogojevic, from Peiping, *Borba*, March 17, 1959.

## Report on Tibet

ONLY TEN DAYS after the outbreak of a revolt in Tibet, that is, 20 days after the first sign of revolt . . . did the [Chinese] press say anything in regard to the developments broadcast throughout the world for days. . . .

Foreign observers had tried to obtain information from official and unofficial Chinese sources, but all in vain. . . . Even though developments in Tibet provoked understandable interest in foreign circles in Peiping, many people . . . were inclined to believe that they did not merit particular attention. As is known, in 1956 there was a revolt among Tibetans in the Western part of Szechwan. . . . But soon, particularly after Nehru's statement . . . it became obvious that official circles were bound to react. . . .

The Chinese version of the latest events is now known. . . . Another question which roused interest concerned the implementation of social and democratic reforms in Tibet. . . . President Mao Tse-tung, speaking of this matter at the February 1957 session of the Supreme State Conference, declared: "It was agreed that reforms . . . in Tibet would not be carried out during . . . the second Five Year Plan.

. . ." The motives for this . . . decision . . . are to be found in the report of the working committee of the Chinese CP . . . announced in August 1957 . . . and stating, among other things, that "the upper classes" in Tibet "were decisively against reforms, whereas the majority of the people were not at all enthusiastic about them." Now, on the other hand, the Chinese communique on developments in Tibet pointed out that "by defeating the revolt, a new page in the history of Tibet has been opened" and that instead of a separation of Tibet from China "the democratization of Tibet is going to be accelerated and accompanied by a new birth of the Tibetan people." In today's communique on "the condemnation of the Tibetan traitors by the people," it was also stated that "the day when the people of Tibet would discard feudal slavery had drawn nearer." Are these statements an indication that reforms in Tibet will not be postponed any longer and that efforts now will be made to put them into effect?

Djordje Bogojevic, from Peiping, *Borba*, March 31, 1959.

## Minority Problems

TODAY the [Chinese] press published interviews . . . with various representatives of Chinese society, particularly religious and minority leaders. . . . All these persons condemned the revolt in Tibet as an act of the "Tibetan reaction and imperialism" and expressed their full support for the central government of China. . . . The press devoted particular attention to the reaction of Tibetans . . . those living in Tibet itself and those in neighboring regions. . . .

More Tibetans live outside Tibet than in Tibet itself. . . . Tibet and the Tsamdo region have about one million three hundred thousand inhabitants, whereas the entire Tibetan minority . . . amounts to almost three million. There has been unrest in these neighboring regions also . . . created mainly by the Tibetan national minority. . . . Aside from Tibetans, there is a fair number of other national minorities in China and there have been [various] difficulties with all of them. . . . Members of the Uigur minority, for example, which has about three million seven hundred thousand members—or rather, conservative and reactionary circles of this minority, according to official proclamations—pressed for a special Uigur Republic and made various other demands . . . quite contrary to the policy of the Chinese [government]. . . .

In China today there are about 35 million members of national minorities . . . a number which does not represent more than six percent of the total population of the country; but the . . . minorities are scattered over more than one half of Chinese territory, mainly border regions, also regions rich in coal, iron ore, rare metals, and other minerals. . . . These are also the most backward Chinese provinces . . . [having] national groups strongly inclined toward separatism and with a fair amount of doubt about the new measures . . . and prone to the influence of various religious and tribal leaders. Because of all this . . . the Chinese press is devoting special attention to the reactions of minority representatives to events in Tibet . . . and the further settlement of conditions there.

*Politika* (Belgrade), April 2, 1959.

# Slum Clearance: After 1970



A Czechoslovak housing development in the town of Poruba, near Ostrava. The population, now 30,000, is expected to reach 100,000 in 1970.

Photo from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), October 1958

**A**FTER TEN YEARS in power the Czechoslovak Communists have at last addressed themselves to their country's housing problem. Party leaders now look forward in their speeches to the day—in 1970—when every family will have a flat of its own. While Czechoslovakia has the best housing standards in the Soviet bloc, conditions have deteriorated since the Communists took power in 1948. The following excerpts from an article by a government housing expert (*Planovane Hospodarstvi* [Prague], December 1, 1958) show that improvement is expected to be slow.

"According to the decision of the Eleventh Party Congress [in June 1958], we must, in order to raise living standards, endeavor to eliminate the housing problem by 1970. . . .

"In the past nine years we have completed a total of 392,000 dwelling units, i.e., approximately the amount that we lost during the war when construction activity was practically at a standstill. However, this amount was not enough to meet the demand for housing, and consequently the number of applicants for housing space increased. . . . In principle, this means that there is not enough new housing to meet the demand resulting from population increase and to offset the losses in old housing, which together represent the so-called most urgent requirement. At the same time, this rate of housing construction cannot ensure the required improvement in the quality of housing. . . .

## Number of Persons per Dwelling Unit

1921	4.3
1930	4.0
1946	3.31
1946 after expulsion of the German population	3.05
1950	3.23
1955	3.28

"One of the most serious causes of the housing shortage is still the low rate of new building. In the past, especially up to 1953, when investments were concentrated on the most important sectors of the national economy, the plans for housing construction were high, but remained unfulfilled. The reason was, and still is, the low technical level of the building industry and an unsatisfactory solution of the interior and exterior aspects of buildings and apartments. . . .

"The relatively high average age of residential buildings, especially in the larger cities, increases the urgency of reconstruction and improvement of sanitation in many city districts and towns. . . .

"The general progress of society brings with it considerable progress in the level of equipment of apartments (built-in kitchens, closets, etc.), which is accompanied by an increase in costs. In order to cut costs per dwelling unit, these interior features are often left out. . . .

"To solve the essence of the housing problem by 1970 means to solve the problem of the number of dwelling units and to eliminate the existing shortage. . . . The solution of the housing problem does not mean that by 1970 all questions concerning the size of apartments, modernization of older units, their location, provision for light, air, etc., will all be solved. . . .

"If all the demands for higher housing standards were to be met fully at the present time, the portion of dwelling units devoted to renewal would have to be considerably higher than the number of units required for providing additions to the housing stock. This is, however, not possible at the present moment. . . .

"The analysis of the present situation shows that to solve the housing problem in its substance by 1970 means to give every household an apartment. . . . It will probably not be possible to attack the problem of replacing technically obsolete dwelling units as the main concern of the housing program until after 1970. At that time it will also be possible to undertake large-scale slum clearance in some cities."

## Poland's Young "Technical Intelligentsia"

*In an age of industrial expansion and technological revolution the scientist is king. This is so in the more advanced Western countries, as well as in the awakening new nations of Asia and Africa, where scientists form the nucleus of a growing "managerial aristocracy." Eastern Europe is no exception to the rule: on the surface at least it would appear that the technical expert belongs to what is now commonly referred to as the new class. The avowed aim is rapid industrialization based on technological advances. The expert is at a premium. He is revered in Communist lore and is a central figure in the areawide long-range planning. He benefits not only from the economic necessities of our times (as is the case elsewhere) but he is also theoretically backed by the full weight of centralized State power. In short, Communist-dominated countries appear to be Party-controlled technocracies—and hence should be the scientists' ideal in many respects.*

*The present article is an attempt to investigate the young technical intelligentsia's life, status and opportunities in present-day Poland. Departing from the more usual procedure of concentrating exclusively on official Communist sources, the editors have supplemented such information with opinions and data gathered in dozens of interviews with Polish students and scientists. An effort was made to add a human dimension to the cold facts without, however, straying from the substance of information officially released by the regime itself.*

*The findings are startling. Except perhaps for a tiny minority of scientists in the Party who occupy leading bureaucratic positions in the administration, the new generation of technologists is as alienated from the system as the rest of the people. If this is so in Poland—the most "liberal" of all regimes in the area—it is undoubtedly even truer for the other countries. The one cardinal difference may be in the degree of hope for improvement that was so typical of the Polish ferment of the 1956 "October days." Hopes rose higher than elsewhere and current disappointment may therefore be that much more poignant. Also, it must not be forgotten that Poland has changed relatively more than the other countries and that some of these changes may have affected the scientists adversely. A reorientation in production goals may, for instance, have left many experts high and dry, unemployed and with no prospects for immediate placement in their specialties. Disorganization, general poverty, provincial drabness, academic restrictions and professional frictions have all persisted despite the new "liberal" climate.*

AFTER THE OCTOBER 1956 "revolution," the Gomulka regime promised to undertake reforms in higher education which would lead to new academic freedoms, the removal of bureaucratic restrictions from university administrations, and a long-term development plan for Polish technology. Within the university itself the Rector and his staff could now be fully elected by the faculty at large; there was to be no interference by the Party in the field of education; in its relations with the State the university was permitted to have partial autonomy; and members of the university who had behaved disgracefully during the Stalinist period were either dismissed from their posts or reassigned.

The rule on compulsory attendance at political lectures was abandoned, and, most important of all, appropriations for higher education were substantially increased. (In 1957, 1.7 billion *zloty* were earmarked for the Ministry of Higher Education; 110 million *zloty* were added to this figure in 1958; and according to Radio Warsaw (January

27), the Ministry will receive, for scholarships, an additional 136.5 million in 1959.) Furthermore, the government made it possible once again to study sociology (abandoned during the Stalinist era), and promised to develop more fully the fields of psychology, philology, and biology. (See *East Europe*, December 1958, pp. 16-21.)

Although some of these promises have been kept and lip-service is still paid to the ideal of "academic freedom," the Gomulka regime has recently begun to reimpose bureaucratic control over the universities while reverting to stricter, more orthodox criteria.\* These new restrictions have crystallized in a tendency to limit academic and scientific freedom of inquiry to the economic needs of the State, relying ever more, as in the past, on bureaucratic routine rather than on personal vision and enterprise. As a result, hopes so high only two years ago have not materialized in expected gains. Radio Warsaw, January 12, ad-

\* Candidates for scholarships, for example, must now have the "proper" political and social background. See below.





Above: A crowded dormitory room in Warsaw Polytechnic.

East Europe Photo

mitted that scientific research was making little progress: "Research is frequently duplicated and similar research institutes are being set up, which naturally leads to wasted effort, and results are below expectation." From all reports a certain stagnation has set in, which extends beyond the laboratory to all aspects of the scientist's social, intellectual and cultural life.

### University Life

**I**N HIS FEELINGS of irritation and helplessness the non-Party technologist (and many, it must be remembered, are not Communists or, if they are, do not belong to the higher echelons of the bureaucracy) shares the lot of other members of the intelligentsia. Faced with a limping national economy, a chronic lack of living space, an insufficient supply of everyday necessities, the special privileges and social discrimination of Party members, he generally sees no place for himself in the future, just as he has so often failed to find it in the present. His admission as a student to a university often dispels any illusions he might have previously held. In a series of interviews with the present generation of students and technicians a vivid picture of life in the groves of academe emerges.

Stanislaw M., a student in Warsaw Polytechnic, succinctly described the housing problem in the following words: "You hear a lot about the new development built by the State for students in the universities, but if you live in the vicinity of the school, you can't live in these special quarters. They are reserved for out-of-town students. The only choice left is to live with your family, which just adds to their financial burden. On the other

hand, if you're 'lucky' enough to find a place in a dormitory, you might think that life would be easier and more conducive to study—not at all! Every dormitory room is primitively furnished and unbelievably crowded with tiers of bunks filling every available space. The possibility for concentrated study simply does not exist."

Halina K., a young chemistry student, painted a similar picture: "What sort of life is this? The constant search for an apartment, for one's own corner, the never-ending pursuit of peace and privacy. . . . My God, what sort of life is it that can be measured by a permanent lack of the most basic things? What sort of life is it when one cannot think about oneself, but is forced to think about the small, insignificant matters which in our country have assumed the proportions of insurmountable problems?"

Classroom facilities are little better, and in some respects even worse, than before the war. This is how a recent visitor to the University of Poznan described the situation in the Department of Medicine: "Before the war 300 students attended the Poznan Academy of Medicine, today there are approximately 3,000 students enrolled. Perhaps this is why neither the clinics nor the laboratories or dissecting rooms are sufficiently equipped to handle the number of students. In this respect there have been absolutely no improvements at the Academy since its opening day. On the contrary, very likely things have gotten worse, since the Academy, because of a lack of funds, is unable to purchase any tools or laboratory equipment—yet these are the very things which are in constant use and most subject to damage or deterioration."

The cultural weekly *Przegląd Kulturalny* (Warsaw), December 12, 1958, featured a discussion before the Sejm



Students in a lecture-hall at the Warsaw Institute of Medical Microbiology.

Poland (Warsaw), No. 9, 1955

[Parliament] on university construction programs which substantiates the aforementioned appraisal: "Higher education never had a long-term investment program proportionate to the investments made in various economic and industrial sectors . . . thus . . . school facilities were becoming outdated in comparison with industrial facilities. . . . Following numerous reductions, the original [1958] Plan calling for 309.8 million *zloty* was trimmed to 177.2 million *zloty*. . . . By September 30, 1958 barely 55 percent of the Plan had been fulfilled as a result of a shortage in building materials and reluctance, on the part of construction enterprises, to complete the more difficult projects. Not a very pretty picture! Unfortunately it must be admitted that conditions in schools of higher education—as far as classroom space and facilities are concerned—are relatively worse than in the prewar period."

Even libraries provide little refuge for the student in search of privacy; they are generally inadequate and overcrowded, with long waiting periods for textbooks. Although most libraries possess Western texts, usually only one or two copies are purchased, thus making impossible their mass circulation. Only Marxist-Leninist works are available in any quantity.

### Scholarships

The minimum living expense for a non-scholarship student is approximately 500 *zloty* a month. The average State scholarship is 360 *zloty*, with the difference in-

come apparently made up by the student's family and whatever work can be obtained by the student himself. There are, however, "premium scholarships," with stipends ranging from 400 to 600 *zloty* per month, awarded to particularly gifted students without regard to the student's financial status. A new plan for 1959, proposed by the Polish Students' Association, calls for an increase in monthly stipends along the following lines: 450 *zloty* the first year, 500 *zloty* the second and third years, 550 *zloty* the fourth and following years. (See *East Europe*, December 1958, pp. 19-20.)

In an interview with Professor Kotowski, Dean of the Mechanics Department of the Polytechnic Institute of the University of Cracow, a reporter extensively quoted Kotowski on the problem of scholarships: "The three most important factors in the awarding of stipends are the student's financial circumstances (the total monthly income of a student's family cannot exceed 500 *zloty* per head), his progress in his studies, and his social-political attitude. Mistakes [in these respects] are entirely possible, particularly for his first year, but it is extremely difficult to arrive at the correct appraisal of a man who is completely unknown. . . . A student who does not pass his examinations on time is deprived of his scholarship. When this is done the student is forced to seek additional employment and is, therefore, unable to liquidate his backlog of studies. A vicious circle results from the failure of the State to provide concessions with regard to this problem." (*Zycie Literackie* [Cracow], January 3, 1959.)

### Prospects for Employment

Nevertheless, the students might well be able to withstand poor housing conditions, antiquated laboratories and inadequate scholarships if there were the promise of future employment utilizing the skills in which they had been trained. Very often this is not so. After 1956, when Poland changed its agricultural policies, greatly reducing collectivization, and tried to rid itself of non-productive industries, the balance sheet between supply and demand also changed radically. Certain categories of engineers, for example, might no longer be needed if there was a sudden cut-back in the industry they had been preparing to enter. Partly no doubt for this reason, though the regime has long stressed the necessity for an ever-increasing number of university graduates, in fact the number of students and graduates has been decreasing. According to Radio Warsaw, February 9, the yearly report on the state of the national economy revealed that the number of full-time students was 108,500 by the end of 1958, 9,000 less than at the end of 1957. A total of 14,500 students graduated from full-time courses in universities, 1,400 less than in 1957.

The State controls the flow of university graduates as well as job opportunities. But jobs for the "new intelligentsia," even for the long-needed technicians, simply do not exist; or if they do exist, not in a way which permits the best use of the graduate's abilities. In an article entitled "Are university graduates threatened with unemployment?" *Gazeta Pomorska* (Bydgoszcz), No. 224, Septem-



ber 1958, discussed the unemployment problem among university people.

"We should not be misled either by employment figures or by newspaper advertisements. . . . They fail to alter the fact that there are many people among us with Master's degrees who are unable to find jobs which they deserve by right of their education. . . . Toward the end of the 1957-1958 school year, Torun University graduated 259 students. . . . They were entirely free to select their own manner and place of employment. The university placement commission assisted them in every way, and offered 189 posts. Their suggestions, however, were followed by only 59 of the graduates, because—to be honest—most of the positions offered were simply not attractive enough to the young graduates. These were, for the most part, jobs in small-town grammar schools or high schools. . . . No wonder that out of the 72 chemistry graduates, only 6 accepted the positions suggested by the commission. The rest of the chemists were unable to find one suitable post."

Even for those who do find employment the wages are extremely low, particularly in comparison with workers, even unskilled laborers. The monthly wages of a university professor are 3,600 *zloty*. An associate professor receives 3,100 *zloty*; assistant professors, 2,000 *zloty*; senior assistants, 1,500 *zloty*; school teachers, 700-1,100 *zloty*. Compare these salaries to those offered in newspaper advertisements (*Kultura i Społeczeństwo* [Warsaw], No. 1, Vol. II, 1958): Stevedores needed—average wages per month, 1,200—1,500 *zloty*; Warsaw Foundry, 50 unskilled workers—1,200—2,000 *zloty*; Chef with diploma, for the Grand Hotel Orbis in Sopot—starting salary of 3,500 *zloty* per month.

It is possible, however, to supplement your income considerably if you are willing to join the Party, lend your name to various committees, and generally participate in

other quasi-academic activities. Josef N., a 24-year-old physics graduate of the University of Cracow, explained how this can be done: "Look, if I want to be a Party lackey—you know, play the game—I can earn a great deal more money than if I remain a mere scientist. Take Professor Stefan Zolkiewski, the Minister of Education. To begin with, he's a professor at Warsaw University. He's also a member of the Central Committee, editor of the cultural weekly, *Nowa Kultura*, vice-president of the Polish UNESCO Committee, one of the Secretaries of the Polish Academy of Science—and God knows what else. And don't forget, each one of these other jobs pays him better than his appointment as a professor."

## Social Life

Faced with such bleak prospects for employment while living under great financial hardship, the students seem eager to escape the squalid reality of their daily life. Extra-curricula student activities generally center around various forms of entertainment; the most popular student pastimes are dances, jazz played by the students themselves, and movies, shown privately in clubs. The favorite meeting places for students outside the school campus are the so-called "cellar night-clubs." These do not advertise and have no signs displayed. In order to visit a "cellar club" you must know a student who frequents one; their entertainment programs are satirical and extremely anti-political, and there is also some dancing. These programs are written, arranged and acted by the students themselves.

The existence of such facilities does not necessarily guarantee a stimulating off-campus life for the students. Zbyszek Z., a 25-year-old student at the Lodz Polytechnic, painted a bleak picture of the social and cultural opportunities now available: "It's pure and simply stagnation. . . . The city has only two decent movie houses; all the others are old, dilapidated fire traps with wooden floors and tiny screens. . . . The same holds true as far as the theaters are concerned. . . . As for the cultural life of young people? Simple: with the approach of evening you either stand in a long line in front of the movie house box-office or you sit in one of the smoke-filled Lodz cafes drinking diluted black coffee—if you have enough money—with a slightly sour piece of pastry. . . . Once a month you attend a dance, held either at the Film or Actors' School. You're lucky if the evening ends without some sort of knife-flashing rumble. . . . Either way everyone is always pretty well drunk. Every coat or jacket is weighted down with at least one bottle. . . . Anyway, where else can you go and what else can you do?"

Student vacations are offered by the Union of Polish Students; however, such vacations are organized in such a manner as to include special training courses in Communist ideology. Vacations are also provided for athletes, faculty members, and other groups who are officially connected with political and social organizations. Approximately one student out of thirty takes advantage of these opportunities.

Many students certainly devote time to religious life.



The Collegium Maius, one of the oldest parts of the Jagellonian University in Cracow, a center of Polish technical and scientific education. The Collegium Maius now houses a museum of science.

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1955

According to Professor Jerzy G., of the University of Cracow, such students are quite discreet in their religious activities. "They are very quiet and moderate. . . . The believers, and this means at least half of them, go to church, but without ostentation. The anti-Catholic militants disappeared from the university, and so did the need to demonstrate the opposite views. In my opinion there is not more than three to five percent of the youth who are convinced Communists. About half of the students are indifferent to both political and religious views."

### Political Indifference

The huge majority of students is not only non-Party but also apolitical. In the more repressive years before Gomulka's return to power the negative effect of official propaganda could not be readily ascertained. Courses in Marxism-Leninism were compulsory for everybody, and the Party-dominated student organizations made its power and presence felt on every conceivable occasion. This was the period of "spontaneous" rallies, "peace appeals" signed by hundreds of thousands of youngsters, and of other communal activities which were the pride of the Party. Then came the thaw, and with it the whole rottenness of the foundations was revealed. Everything crumbled almost overnight and students openly showed their hatred for their tormentors. Then, after a while, detachment set in. According to a student at the Gliwice Academy of Mines, the situation is now as follows:

"I never noticed any kind of enthusiasm among the students of the Mining Academy. There have been no political debates or ideological discussions there since the Marxist-Leninist courses were removed from the curriculum. For this reason, the Association of Polish Students has no influence among the students, despite the fact that in recent months it has been more active. . . . The students devote themselves at present exclusively to their studies, taking advantage, whenever possible, of Western technical literature. In spite of the number of Soviet scientific books available, students often criticize publicly the so-called 'experiments and successes of the Soviets.'"

Such indifference to Communist ideology has recently begun to worry high government officials. Minister of Education Stefan Zolkiewski in an article in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), September 24, admitted that the great majority of students were not devoted to "Socialism," and were inclined to restrict themselves to the roles of observers or critics. He urged more attention be paid to Marxist philosophy and economics and concluded with the statement that a student's social-political attitude would now play an important part in the awarding of scholarships. (See *East Europe*, November 1958, p. 38.)

A reporter from the Cracow weekly *Zycie Literackie* (January 3, 1959), described in some detail the prevailing mood of science students enrolled in an institute of technology at the University of Cracow: "Science above all—but that is not yet everything. There still remains the question of social and political education . . . [in this respect] the prospects are poor. The entire school [in November 1958] has only 30 ZMS [Union of Socialist



Polish students in one of their cellar clubs, "Harenda."  
Photo from *Od Nowa* (Warsaw), February 1, 1959

Youth] members . . . and yet the percentage of students from workers' and peasant families is relatively high. . . .

"I spent several days among 18-year old Freshmen . . . who found their first lectures disappointing. They imagined the Polytechnic Institute to be different, more professional and attractive. They are completely disoriented with regard to the future course of their studies, not to mention future employment. . . .

"Their faces fell when [I asked them if they would] join the ZMS. Perhaps—but they are not familiar with the aims of the organization, and they're afraid of politics. . . . Our talks lasted three days, but my conclusions can be reduced to a few sentences. The age of the students and the uniformity of their 'opinions' (if such ambiguity can be called an opinion) makes any independent achievement of the proper ideological-political level impossible."

On the basis of a poll conducted at the Polytechnic Institute, the journalist sadly summed up the "typical Polytechnic student": "That individual is ascetically thin; he studies all night and attends classes during the day so that he may finally get some sleep in the lecture hall. Once a . . . year he reads a book and from time to time he visits the . . . movie theater. He doesn't give a damn about anything except his studies, which he complains about, and money, which he is always short of."

A poll conducted among students by *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), October 12, 1958, revealed the following answers to the question, "Are you a Marxist": Yes—1.8 percent; Yes, with reservations—11.4 percent; I don't know—17.2 percent; No, with reservations—33.7 percent; No—34.1 percent.

### Life in the Provinces

THE INTELLECTUAL INERTIA among graduates and young professionals is particularly acute in the provincial university towns; in this environment a dynamic new intelligentsia has not materialized. Without benefit of direct contact with Warsaw, the provincial town suffers from cultural stagnation, even when it is a large, industrial city such as Lodz.

The second largest city in Poland with approximately 690,000 inhabitants, Lodz has often been called the Polish Manchester. Yet in 1957, in *Zycie Literackie*, July 18, a

journalist described the "workers' city" as follows: "Lodz, which had been raised to the dignity of a proletarian symbol, has been for some time and still continues to be on the road to oblivion. . . . The venerable, old wooden huts are still being pressed into service as a result of the acute housing shortage. The apartment houses are terribly drab and have no plumbing. The gutters overflow with city refuse. . . . Only a very few housing blocks can boast of all the modern conveniences such as gas or plumbing. . . . Such is Lodz, a sad city that you cannot help but love when you live there, but which is easily forgotten once you leaves its boundaries."

Yet, in an industrial and university city such as Lodz, the prophets of Polish Communism have long proclaimed that an "ideological union between the working people's intelligentsia and the masses" would take place. Apparently, just the opposite has occurred. In 1957, Professor Chalasinski added a new footnote to his thesis, *The Social Geneology of the Polish Intelligentsia*, published in 1946. Commenting on the twelve years of Communist rule in Poland, he said: "The myth of the unity between the progressive intellectuals and the working masses has completely disintegrated. . . . The new intelligentsia of peasant or working-class origins does not show any strong social or spiritual links with its original, people's environment . . . the reason for this lack of success is to be sought in the unattractive character of the intellectual culture which was meant to be the basis of the uniting process." (Quoted in *Zycie Literackie* [Warsaw], Sept. 11, 1958.)

Rather than finding fulfillment in the "workers' city" the intellectual sees only boredom and apathy. Once again, to quote from *Zycie Literackie*, July 18: "To certain Lodz intellectuals, if there is anything important, it is Warsaw. Many of them talk of nothing but Warsaw and her problems, and dream of leaving Lodz. . . . There is a myth in this country, which is actually not only a myth, but a reality—that one cannot really live and mean anything

outside the limits of Warsaw. . . . Lodz has no cultural centers . . . only a few bridge clubs. But the word stagnation when applied to general, impersonal problems, really has very little meaning . . . to understand its meaning as far as everyday life is concerned, you need only take a good look at all of us. . . . [For example], take the architect and decorator. . . . He's full of ideas and modern solutions, but nothing comes of it, for there's no one around who will put them into practice. 'We're not at that stage yet,' the bureaucrats tell him after inspecting his plan for new workers' settlements, patterned after the recent achievements of French and Italian housing construction. 'We're just in the stage of renovating old houses, and there you are thinking of new ones. . . . It would be much better if you took an interest in something else, for example, decorating dance halls. . . . Easy and pleasant work and the pay is not bad at all. . . . And so our friend listened to this advice and is now busy decorating dance halls and expositions. Socialism, he says, obviously needs decorations not houses and let it be so.'

### The Polish Academy

THE TECHNOLOGIST like other intellectuals often falls a victim to the underdeveloped cultural and intellectual life in the provinces; but for those few who manage to attain some eminence in their field, problems of another dimension confront them. From the moment of its inception in Poland, "Socialism" launched "an offensive on the educational front . . . to produce a new intelligentsia"; to facilitate this, the regime soon re-established the Polish Academy of Sciences and vested it with the power to control and organize all the remaining scientific centers in the country.

The political aims of the Academy in the Stalinist period were closely united with those of the Party and government: the struggle against "bourgeois science"; supremacy of "progressive" Soviet science; removal from authority of prewar professors and teachers. The Academy was provided with a fictional front in the form of so-called "scientists' self-government." In reality the Academy was controlled by others. According to an article in *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo* (Warsaw) Vol. 1, No. 1, 1957, "the genuine administrators [of the Academy] were the [Communist] Party authorities . . . represented in the Academy by the Scientific Secretariat. It was within the competence of the Secretariat to administer numerous Academy affairs; it was not, however, independent, but functioned under a mandate from non-scientific circles. . . . A striking feature of the Secretariat was not only its almost absolute Party characteristics, but also the fact that its members were supplemented by four persons who were not even members of the Academy. . . ."

"From the moment of its establishment the Academy's activities were burdened on the one hand by the fiction of the scientist's autonomy, and on the other hand by the . . . subservience of the Academy to non-scientific political circles. . . ."

At the end of 1956, the "achievements" of the Polish Academy were as follows: out of a total of 68 scientific



Minister of Higher Education Stefan Zolkiewski, left, talking to the Rector of Warsaw University. Polish students mention Zolkiewski as an example of those members of the technical intelligentsia who carved out well-rewarded careers for themselves by political activities. He was recently removed from office. Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 8, 1958

centers under its jurisdiction 19 institutions were devoted to social studies; 10 to chemistry, mathematics, geography and physics; 6 to agriculture; and 7 to medicine. In a nation which is striving to attain a rapid growth of modern technology and science and whose agricultural methods are backward and outdated, the ratio of social science (i.e. Marxist-Leninist theory) to pure science, agricultural methods, and medicine reveals the true nature of the Academy.

For the scientist studying today in a university, the opportunity to work as a pure scientist is often negated because of continued interference by the Party itself or, through it, by the machinery of the Polish Academy. The eminent Polish scientist, Wladyslaw Szafer, in an article in *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, *loc. cit.*, stated: "As a result of the errors on the part of the Polish Academy of Sciences . . . we have lost numerous positions in the world of science. In the field of international botany, this was caused either by the unexplained failure to permit Polish scientists to attend international congresses . . . or the attendance . . . of small groups of delegates who cannot be acknowledged as representative of Polish botany."

### Relations with East, West

**B**ESIDES THE BUREAUCRATIC stranglehold of the Polish Academy which remains a prime source of irritation to the scientist, many steps taken by the Gomulka regime in recent months have also impeded the advance of Polish science. Although the scientists apparently do not object to re-establishing closer bonds with the Soviet Union by taking advantage of the large number of scholarships now available to Soviet universities, of invitations to scientific congresses, and a genuine exchange of scientific data, their hostility toward the USSR is still reflected in their attitude toward the arrival of individual Soviet scientists and students on Polish soil. Between 1948-1956, the Soviet visitors were greeted with flowers by their Polish counterparts waiting at the railroad stations and airports—"spontaneous demonstrations," prepared well in advance in accordance with Party regulations. Since 1956 the situation has changed radically: there is almost no one to welcome the new Soviet visitors, and the Polish Academy is hard put to explain the conspicuous absence of representatives of Polish science.

Although the bitterness of Polish savants derives in great part from their experiences during the Stalinist era, they still have cause to distrust and dislike the Soviet Union. Even today, Polish scientists in such fields as applied mathematics, physics, chemistry, and other specialized research projects, must make periodic trips to the USSR to attend so-called consultations. This procedure is necessary in the name of "strategically important scientific aims and studies," and according to Wladyslaw H., a young researcher at the University of Warsaw, is practiced in the following manner: "A Polish scientist is officially instructed by his superiors to present himself at a certain institute in the Soviet Union. There you are met by a Soviet professor to whom you must submit all data and conclusions concerning your research. Under a facade of 'consulta-

Poster advertising a satirical review, "Anything Can Happen," given in the Warsaw students' club "Stodola."

*Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), February 12, 1959





tion," you have to surrender the results of your experiments to some anonymous Soviet scientific institute. Even worse than this is the outright appropriation by Soviet institutes of Polish inventions, which are later proclaimed in scientific journals published in the USSR as the work of 'Soviet scientists' collectives.'"

At the same time, at international councils as well as in articles published in the USSR, the achievements of Polish scientists are treated marginally or solely as the result of Polish-Soviet cooperation.

Equally humiliating is the treatment by the Soviet Union of Polish scientists who request the permission to borrow or use certain materials necessary to assure the success of a given experiment or research project; in almost every such case the Poles encounter a curt refusal, the excuse being that the request is a "USSR military secret."

Other evidence of the regime's "retreat from October" is seen in the reluctance of the government to increase the number of the Polish students allowed to study in the West—even though the demand for such an opportunity is widespread both among students and established graduates. In 1958, for example, there were only 100 Polish students studying in France—50 students on French scholarships, 20 on Ford Foundation grants, and only 30 on Polish government stipends. Those receiving American scholarship grants are often viewed with suspicion, and there is almost no opportunity to write objective reports or technical studies concerning the United States. According to an eminent professor, "strict censorship can stop every publication which the Party does not approve of." In some cases Polish scientists, upon returning from visits to the USA, were unable to report fully and openly on what they had learned or seen.

## Conclusion

FROM THE FOREGOING it can be seen that dissatisfaction is generated by all kinds of sources, that difficulties and frustrations dog the young scientist all the way through school, within the academic world and outside, and then also in his field—if he happens to be lucky enough to find a place for himself in his own profession. Apparently the startling pessimism of what should be a contented elite has its root at the very core of reality in Communist-run countries. Like others, scientists are in constant rebellion against the lack of choice. Though they take a leading part in creating and managing new industries, the basic decisions are not theirs but the Party bureaucrats'. Though their education and knowledge gives them special insight on what can be done (and has been done in the West and elsewhere), they must accept the inefficiencies, the inequalities and distortions introduced by persons who constantly interfere without having the qualifications to do so. And there is no alternative, no recourse to appeals or evasion. "The past and present forms of increasing scientific development were dictated by the intellectual doctrine of the educators rather than by the people's actual needs," wrote Tadeusz Nowacki, a professor at Warsaw Polytechnic, in *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, July-August, 1958. And he

adds: "We have lovely booklets on the construction of bridges and atomic energy plants, but at the same time the peasant keeps his fertilizer in a shed near the stream, which spoils the fertilizer and contaminates the water. . . ."

On top of all his personal problems the scientist is thus also deprived of the pride of accomplishment which, under normal circumstances, would be rightfully his. This article has not attempted to go into the technical aspects of each profession, yet there is ample evidence that what is true with respect to fertilizers and agriculture in general equally applies to other fields. Jerzy Z. a mathematics student, reports, for instance, that after acquainting himself with the latest advances in the United States, he is convinced that the computing machines now being built in Poland, according to rigid planning, were discarded in the West as obsolete anywhere from five to eight years ago.

Certain professions or fields of endeavor were blacklisted in the Stalinist period and hence were almost totally ignored. Sociology and psychology are two such branches which had to survive in the dark in the face of official disapproval, lack of funds and other obstacles. Even today their "acceptance" is tenuous, a function not of their intrinsic worth but of fluctuating political considerations. As one student put it, "These sciences have no right of existence in Poland because they do not exist in the same form in the USSR. Sociology in the USSR is considered a decadent, bourgeois science, anti-Soviet, imperialist, and covering up class conflicts. Polish sociology has clearly pro-American leanings and its ties to the US date back several decades. Besides, sociological method excludes any such abstract and generalized points of view as proposed by the 'purest' version of Soviet Marxist-Leninism. . . . Its life expectancy under the Gomulka regime will probably be very short because 'its presence in Polish universities is creating a barrier between Polish and Soviet science.'"

Such, then, is the background to one of the most surprising paradoxes of life in Eastern Europe today: scientists, who should have been able to realize their ambitions better than others and should form a center of loyalty, are neither fulfilled nor apparently very loyal. Will this condition change in coming years? To some extent it may. The post-Stalinist period is more pragmatic, more flexible. Some of the changes that have taken place have been in the right direction. But after the first gush of enthusiasm and exploration, timidity and regression quickly took over. There is still a residue of novelty, but it is minimal. The scientists who know at least the outlines of the possible, cannot fail to feel restive and frustrated. As in so many other spheres, their interests, personal and professional, are at odds with those of the Party. At the moment Gomulka's policy is to consolidate Communism in Poland at all costs. In these circumstances, the immediate outlook for the young technical intelligentsia remains bleak. As for the more distant future, the Party will undoubtedly try, as has happened in the Soviet Union, to incorporate this group in its own ranks. What this would do to the bulk of technologists and to the Party remains to be seen.

# Birth Control Propaganda

The population question, first raised by the English clergyman Malthus in the early nineteenth century, has always been treated by orthodox Marxist theorists as a bourgeois invention designed to justify low wages and defend the capitalist system. But recently the Hungarian and Chinese regimes have carried on propaganda to teach birth control to the masses. Following is a survey of these campaigns, showing the strains that underlie Communist orthodoxy.

**M**ETHODS OF CONTRACEPTION must be made known to the public; lectures should be given on the use of contraceptives. . . . In 1955 the number of abortions was 35,400, in 1956 it was 80,000 and in 1957 the figure rose to more than 120,000. . . . We must not forget that the tremendous increase in our population between 1953 and 1956 created problems which have not yet been solved. . . . At present 40 percent of the classrooms in all general schools are used by more than one group . . . by 1960 we shall have to squeeze into existing schools an additional 200,000 children. A further increase in the birthrate would bring about an even greater worsening of the housing shortage. . . . Thus it is evident that the growth of population is also an economic problem."

These words were published not in India or Japan but in the Hungarian Communist Party newspaper *Nepszabadsag* on May 22, 1958. Fully to appreciate their irony one must compare them with the orthodox Communist attitude formerly expounded in the Hungarian press. During Stalin's time the anti-Malthusian doctrine stemming from Marx was elevated to a State policy and pursued so strictly that contraceptives were unobtainable in Communist countries, and abortion was permitted only when it could be shown that pregnancy would endanger the mother's health. The thesis that there could be no population problem under Socialism was married to the demographic policies of the Soviet Union, with its vast and thinly populated territories, and made into a tenet of faith that was binding upon all Communist Parties regardless of their circumstances. The standard attitude was expressed by Nikita Khrushchev in a speech to a Moscow Komsomol meeting in January 1955:

"Bourgeois ideology invented many cannibalistic theories, among them the theory of over-population. Their concern is to cut down the birth rate, reduce the rate of population increase. It is quite different with us, comrades. If about 100 million people were added to our 200 million, even that would not be enough. Under Socialism the raising of the birth rate is regarded not only as a means of providing greater labor power. The Socialist State also looks at the matter from the viewpoint of the nation's future." (As quoted in a Radio Moscow broadcast to Southeast Asia, July 4, 1958.)

In 1956 a more liberal attitude began to prevail. The Supreme Soviet passed a law permitting abortion in the State-run hospitals at the woman's request, and the East European regimes liberalized their abortion laws in a similar fashion not long afterward. The intention was not to encourage the interruption of pregnancy, but to stop the clandestine practice of it by private doctors, midwives and quacks, a practice which had apparently assumed large dimensions. This reform was necessarily accompanied by clinical advice on contraception so as to reduce the number of women seeking abortions for personal and economic reasons. However, the social desirability of a high birth



In a Czechoslovak maternity ward. The caption speaks of "one day's 'harvest'" of babies; Czechoslovakia, unlike Hungary, still tends to pursue the classic line that the more births the better.

Photo from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), February 6, 1959

rate continued to be gospel in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and it was implemented by family allowances, day nurseries and free medical services as well as by general ignorance of contraceptive techniques.

### Legal Abortion: Hungary

The Stalinist doctrine had been maintained with great fervor in small, impoverished Hungary, from the time the Communists gained power until early in 1956 when Moscow revised its policy. "The heart of the family is the child, and the mother who gave him birth. The more children there are, the stronger is the family—and the nation. . . . We are happy to have a large family, our State has provided the necessary financial foundation for it. . . . But not so in the capitalist countries, where the fate of the poor is privation and dreary hopelessness while the rich enjoy security, comfort and luxury." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], February 10, 1953.) The fact that human reproduction may raise serious social and economic problems seems to have achieved full recognition only after the Revolt of October 1956, which did so much to shatter the received ideas of Hungarian Communism. In this, as in other areas of national policy, the old Communist theme of joy and plenitude has given way to a kind of negative practicality that would formerly have been denounced as "bourgeois."

The process began with a decree published in June 1956 that permitted doctors to perform abortions at the request of the mother, even if her pregnancy did not pose a danger to her health. It provided, of course, that the three-man committees established to pass upon such cases must "try to convince the petitioner of the desirability of keeping the child" and inform her "of the harmful consequences of an abortion, particularly if pregnancy has been interrupted repeatedly." The measure was designed not to encourage abortions but to discourage the clandestine practice of them under hazardous conditions. The consequences of similar reforms in other Communist countries have received a minimum of publicity, and no doubt vary with national conditions and the degree to which the new provisions are actually implemented.\* In Hungary the immediate result was a startling rise in the number of legally performed abortions, from 35,400 in 1955 to more than 120,000 in 1957. (*Nepszabadsag*, May 22, 1958.) Early in 1958 they were said to be running at 5,000 a month in Budapest alone, or more than three times the live birth rate. (*Nepszava*, May 27, 1958.)

Much of this increase, of course, was only statistical and reflected the large number of abortions that had previously been clandestine and therefore uncounted. Nevertheless,

\* In Czechoslovakia the State Population Commission reported that in the first six months of 1958 there had been 39,732 legal abortions, as against 128,518 live births. About 85 percent of the requests for abortion were granted. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], October 4, 1958.) The abortion rate in Slovakia, predominantly Catholic and peasant, was only half that in Bohemia and Moravia. (*Svobodne Slovo* [Prague], October 11, 1958.)

In Poland the law passed in 1956 is thought to have had only a minimal influence on the number of illegal abortions. A writer in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 23, 1959, estimated that illegal abortions in Warsaw had averaged 5,000 a year since 1954, with very little change.

### Planned Parenthood in Shanghai

THE CADRES of the Health Bureau of Shanghai Municipality, in order to set an example for others, have started to practice planned childbirth. All the comrades of the Bureau have decided to map out this week their childbirth plan for the Second Five Year Plan period. The comrades in the women's and children's clinic have finished their planning ahead of time and thrown out a challenge to the other sections of the Bureau. . . . The medical and prevention department of the Bureau have accepted the challenge; no less than 64 percent of the members who already have children have guaranteed that they will produce no more babies during the Second Five Year Plan. [Other sections] guarantee that they will cut their birth rate from 20 percent during the First Five Year Plan to 4 percent during the Second Five Year Plan."

(*Wen Hui Pao* [Shanghai], January 23, 1958.)

the figures were a terrible commentary on the state of public morale in Kadar's Hungary, and tended to bear out recent reports of widespread promiscuity among young unmarried people. Such a state of affairs obviously required countermeasures. The government began to publish information on methods of preventing pregnancy, and mobilized doctors, midwives and welfare agencies to spread the information. On January 23, 1958, all the daily papers carried an article entitled: "Information Issued by the Ministry of Health on the Prevention of Pregnancy," which gave the rationale behind the campaign.

"One of the most important tasks of the Ministry of Health is the protection of women's health. At the request of women, undesirable pregnancies are interrupted in modern, well-equipped institutions, by experienced physicians. However, such artificial interventions are not wholly harmless. . . .

"For this reason, the Ministry of Health and experts on matters of health recommend the prevention of pregnancies rather than their artificial interruption. . . .

"A sufficient quantity of contraceptives will be made available to the general public. Obstetricians and other physicians will give the necessary information concerning their use and application. In support of the work of enlightenment, the Ministry of Health has already printed and distributed among the general public more than 300,000 leaflets.

"In this work of contraceptive enlightenment, the social organizations, trade unions, the National Council of Women, the Hungarian Red Cross and the KISZ [Communist youth organization] may be of great help to the State welfare and health service."

The campaign met with a remarkable lack of interest, both from the public and from the medical profession. An article in *Nepszava* on May 27 described the campaign in Budapest as "almost completely unsuccessful." The Budapest Women's Council and the health authorities had con-

centrated their efforts in the working class district of Ujpest. "Lectures were given by qualified physicians and apparently they were received with great interest. A large number of women came for counselling, and requests for contraceptives increased. But the general situation shows no improvement; on the contrary, applications for abortions are more numerous than before. The number of abortions is steadily increasing, not only in this district but in Budapest as a whole. More and more lectures are delivered on methods of contraception and the number of abortions keeps going up. Every possible means of contraception has been made available, but apparently the women do not heed the advice given by their doctors."

### Neo-Malthusians Rebuffed

The authorities were obviously faced with some of the classic obstacles besetting neo-Malthusians the world over. An article in *Nepszava* on October 17, 1958, observed that contraceptives of the best type were available in every pharmacy but were simply not used. Even married couples did not seem to realize that "the best way to avoid an undesired pregnancy is by preventing it, in their own interest." The writer gave no estimate of the relative frequency of abortions among married women as compared to single women, but if the contraception campaign failed with the former it could not hope to succeed with the unmarried. "Another grave obstacle is that there are still many physicians working in the clinics and counselling offices who do not recognize the value and necessity of contraceptives. There are even some who dissuade the women from their use. . . . According to the Ministry of Health, the attitude of some doctors is due to business considerations. They are reluctant to participate in counselling under the State-sponsored national program, preferring to do business in their private offices. . . . Others of the physicians are reluctant to participate because of religious or chauvinistic considerations. They object to the use of contraceptives from a moral point of view. They speak of interfering in the work of nature or God, or talk of the dangers of a decreasing population. . . . It is imperative that the Ministry of Health continue the drive to popularize contraception more intensively and on a larger scale than before. The Ministry must do everything to induce the whole medical profession to consider it their ethical and professional duty to work along these lines. . . ."

After this inauspicious beginning the campaign received no further publicity in the Hungarian press. The whole matter has evidently been relegated to the limbo of other chronic social problems, such as prostitution, the existence of which is not officially recognized by the Workers' State.

### Birth Control in China

THE WEAKNESS of the anti-Malthusian dogma was that it elevated a national policy of the Soviet Union into a tenet of faith binding upon all Communists everywhere. The desirability of a high birth rate everywhere and at all times—or, to be more precise, the bias against any action to reduce the birth rate—was challenged in a fundamental

way by the leaders of Communist China late in 1956. For reasons quite different from those motivating the Hungarian regime, the Chinese launched a similar campaign to popularize birth control on a mass scale. While the top Party spokesmen were careful not to make statements contradicting the received doctrine as to the blessedness of large families and the wickedness of neo-Malthusians, they demonstrated in practice that they regarded the population question as a problem of grave importance. In their effort to familiarize the masses with contraceptive devices, the authorities employed the same organs of public agitation that had formerly been directed at the sparrow and the fly. Trade unions, people's councils, street committees, wall newspapers, loudspeakers and lantern slides were all brought to bear upon the new target. The intensity of the campaign in the city of Shanghai was described by an eyewitness in the *Hongkong South China Morning Post* on June 15, 1957:

"On billboards, in the most crowded places all over the town, in the windows of stores, inside and outside of clinics, there are displays of the human anatomy, posters spreading information on contraception and popularizing the methods aimed at prevention of births. . . ."

"Where but recently there hung pictorial displays of the blessedness that the new marriage law was supposed to bring to the populace . . . where children were a blessing and were encouraged by the State, now hang strip pictures portraying the hardships of parents overburdened by large families and in consequence living in financial misery, lacking in nightly sleep, and not having enough time for cultural life. Alongside are displayed practical suggestions on how to prevent conception with the aid of contraceptives, chemical and mechanical. These displays, which leave nothing to the imagination, are equally accessible to mature people and to youngsters of all ages, and it is not uncommon to see groups of children gathered around and discussing the pictures."

The Chinese were motivated, of course, by the tremendous size of their population in relation to arable land and by the discovery that the population was increasing by more than two percent annually, a rate which would double it in a generation. Official statements were bravely optimistic, pointing out that the Chinese economy was expanding much faster than the population and that in a Socialist society there could not be such a thing as too many people. But if man could control his environment, the argument ran, there was no reason why, under Socialism, he should not also control the growth of population. Mao Tse-tung, in his only published statement on the subject, said in February 1957: "We have this large population. It is a good thing, but of course it also has its difficulties." Off the record he had evidently said considerably more, because a speaker at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March 1957 cited him as follows:

"Chairman Mao's brilliant instruction that the Chinese people should control childbirth in a planned manner has stirred all intellectuals of the medical and public health circles throughout the country. This creative directive has great political, economic, historical and international significance. All medical personnel, together with the people throughout the country, should respond enthusiastically to



## The March of Science

**O**CTOBER 1956: "Fresh tadpoles coming out in the spring should be washed clean in cold well water and swallowed whole three or four days after menstruation. If a woman swallows fourteen live tadpoles on the first day and ten more on the following day, she will not conceive for five years. If contraception is still required after that, she can repeat the formula twice, and be forever sterile. . . . This formula is good in that it is effective, safe, and not expensive. The defect is that it can be used only in the spring."

(Dr. Yeh Hsi-chun, a deputy to the 1956 Chinese National People's Congress, as reported in the Quarterly Bulletin of the Family Planning Association of Hong Kong, December 1956.)

**A**PRIL, 1958: "The prescription of using tadpoles as a contraceptive has been tested by the physiological laboratory of the Chekiang Research Institute of Chinese Medicine and has tentatively been proved useless. For the purpose of testing the effectiveness of the tadpoles as a contraceptive, the Chekiang Research Institute of Chinese Medicine selected from the joint public-private Hangchow Emporium, the Hangchow Cotton Mill and from among the residents of Hangchow City 64 women between 25 and 45 years of age, who had given birth to three or more children and were willing to swallow tadpoles as a test. The tadpoles were swallowed three to five days after the menstruation period, according to the instructions of Dr. Yeh Hsi-chun. Twenty-four and twenty tadpoles were swallowed respectively on the first and second day. According to investigations conducted to check the effectiveness of tadpoles as a contraceptive, among the 42 female workers of the Hangchow Cotton Mill who swallowed the tadpoles between April 5 and May 4 last year, 18 persons, or 43 percent of those who went through the test, became pregnant. Among the Hangchow residents who swallowed tadpoles for contraceptive purposes, two women became pregnant after a month."

(*Jen Min Jih Pao* [Peiping], April 14, 1958.)

Chairman Mao's call and must take positive action to make a success of this great and glorious task." (*Jen Min Jih Pao* [Peiping], March 17, 1957.)

Premier Chou En-lai had voiced his approval of birth control at the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1956: "To protect women and children and bring up and educate our younger generation in a way conducive to the health and prosperity of the nation, we agree that a due measure of birth control is desirable. Health departments should, in cooperation with other institutions concerned, carry out intelligent propaganda and adopt effective measures towards this end."

In contrast to the cautious statements of the top leaders, the daily press was more specific as to the motives behind the birth control campaign. An article in *Jen Min Jih Pao* on October 9, 1957, argued the need for birth control in order to prevent a decline in living standards:

"Workers' wages and living quarters have shown a rate of growth never before witnessed in our history. If workers and employees plan childbirth, they can manage a well-to-do life. On the other hand, if the number of births in four years rises nearly to the level of the total number of women workers, as is the case in the Shanghai No. 2 Cotton Mill, increases in the living standard cannot but be limited. For neither the rate of growth of production nor the rate of wage increase can catch up with this birth rate."

"Hence the final conclusion is birth control. Only when childbirth is planned can increased wages and more housing bring about a real improvement in the living standard of workers and employees."

Another article in the same paper on February 1, 1958, attacked both the "leftist" and the "rightist" views on population. It characterized the former as holding the classical Communist doctrine that a huge population raises no problem at all, and the latter as maintaining that a large population is "absolutely a bad thing." The paper said that the Party opposed both views but was not blind to two difficulties of a large population. One difficulty arose from the limitations of China's economy, and the other from the high rate at which the population was increasing. Together they created a situation in which "industry is incapable of producing sufficient consumer goods to meet the steadily increasing needs of the people."

Shortly after this, the Chinese birth control campaign was buried under the avalanche of propaganda which accompanied the formation of communes and the commencement of the new economic drive called "the big leap forward." Statements again appeared in the press stressing the advantages of a large population and assuring the world that China's agricultural progress would soon eliminate the problem of food supply. The New China News Agency declared on October 1, 1958: "The year's agricultural achievements have proved that with the country's existing cultivated land, China will have enough to feed a population several times the existing 650 million." The new optimism seemed to imply that the regime was no longer disturbed over China's increasing numbers, at least in the short run, but there was no evidence that the birth control program had been abandoned. There are indications that it has merely been relegated to the administrative level in order to give the organs of propaganda a chance to take up new problems. An editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao* on August 29, 1958, discussed the question whether life in the communes might encourage people to have more children and concluded that commune members "understand the advantages of birth control and planned parenthood." And a reporter for the London *Daily Worker* wrote on October 21 that when he visited the Sinli Commune he had seen contraceptives on sale in the stores.

# Current Developments

## AREA

### Khrushchev in Albania

On May 25, Soviet Premier and Party head Nikita Khrushchev arrived in Tirana for a 10-day stay in Albania, the only East European country he had not previously visited. Earlier that day, the Soviet leader exchanged cordial greetings with Marshal Tito on the occasion of the latter's 67th birthday; this sudden truce in the Yugoslav-Soviet bloc "cold war" continued throughout the Albanian junket. Among the members of the Soviet delegation was Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky; also present in Albania during the Khrushchev visit were East German Premier Otto Grotewohl, allegedly vacationing there, and Communist China's Defense Minister Marshal Peng Teh-huai, who had been touring other East European countries since mid-April.

Stealing headlines from the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, Khrushchev delivered the first major speech of his tour at Tirana's Stalin textile mills, May 27. After paying tribute to the late American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as an "outstanding politician" (see below), he began a series of attacks on Greece and Italy regarding the installation of American missile bases. At the same time, he proposed that the Balkans be made "a peninsula of peace":

"Recently the Italian government, despite the wishes of the Italian people, agreed to the establishment of American rocket bases on the territory of Italy. Now the United States of America is negotiating with the Greek government for the establishment of similar bases on Greek soil. It is evident that these bases are directed against the Soviet Union, Albania and other Socialist countries. . . . We suggest that the Balkan peninsula be made a peninsula of peace without any missiles or nuclear weapons."

Furthermore, the Soviet Premier made it clear that if the Greek and Italian governments did not comply with his demands, the USSR would probably set up missile bases in Bulgaria and Albania:

"But if, as the saying goes, the devil leads the Greek government into temptation and it makes the unwise decision of permitting the Americans to establish rocket bases on its territory, by this very fact it will compel us to build up our forces for an appropriate response. Where will our rocket installations be placed—here, on Albanian territory? Or will the rockets come down on the rocket bases in Greece from Bulgaria or another country? These are questions which we shall discuss and agree on among ourselves." (Radio Tirana, May 27.)

Similar threats against Italy and Greece were repeated in



Here and below: rare candid pictures of Tirana, capital of Albania, recent site of the visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev and other leaders from the area. Albania is by far the smallest and most backward and primitive country of Eastern Europe. Its population is about 1,400,000, that of Tirana about 130,000.

East Europe Photos

Khrushchev's speech in Korce, May 28, and for the first time Yugoslavia was mentioned, here in connection with the "liquidation of the 'cold war' and the relaxation of international tension." Referring to his suggestion for a demilitarized zone in the Balkans, the Soviet Premier declared that these proposals were supported by Yugoslavia. In this same speech, however, without referring to Yugoslavia by name, he defended the ideological stand taken by the Albanian Party:

"Your Party, which has the support of all the people, is resolutely waging a struggle against any manifestations of opportunism and revisionism, against any traitors who deviate from Marxist-Leninist theory, against those who fight this theory. Our people firmly back your Party in all the resolute struggles it is waging. . . . The fact that you have achieved outstanding victories and successes is due, to a considerable extent, to the correct leadership of the Albanian Marxist-Leninist Workers' Party, of the Central Committee of your Party, led by the leader of the Albanian people, our friend, Comrade Enver Hoxha!" (Radio Moscow, May 29.)

The joint communique, issued on June 1, contained many of the points Premier Khrushchev had already made during the tour. It enunciated the Soviet proposals for a separate peace treaty with East Germany and the establishment of a demilitarized "free city" in West Berlin, as well as the demand for an atom-free zone in the Balkans and the convocation of a meeting of the heads of all Balkan States to discuss

## Current Developments—Area

this question (this idea was originally put forward by Romania in September 1957 and turned down by Greece and Turkey). Referring to Yugoslavia, both countries declared their "readiness to develop their relations in the future with . . . Yugoslavia . . . on the basis of mutual respect, equality and noninterference in each other's affairs."

The statement also stressed the importance of the declaration of the Moscow conference of November 1957, which termed "revisionism" as the chief danger threatening the "security of the Socialist camp." (Radio Moscow, June 1.)

### Italy, Greece Reply

Countering Khrushchev's threats against Italy, the Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella termed the Soviet leader's speeches in Albania as "a propaganda maneuver," and "a vain attempt to divide us from our allies." (*The New York Times*, May 29.)

The Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averof, stated that Greece had no intention of bowing to any pressure from friends or to threats from enemies in its decision whether or not to establish rocket bases on its territory, according to a Western press report, May 27.

### Yugoslav Reaction

Drago Kunc, spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, commented tersely on the fact that Nikita Khrushchev had refrained from directly attacking Yugoslavia in Albania. "It is a fact," Kunc said at a press conference, May 29, "that there has been a certain abatement [in the campaign against Yugoslavia]. Otherwise I have nothing to say." He also stated that Yugoslavia had long opposed the setting up of rocket bases in the Balkans. (Radio Belgrade, May 29.)

Tito himself replied to Khrushchev's suggestion to ban nuclear weapons in the Balkans in a speech at Smederevo,

Serbia, June 8. He declared that Italy as well as the "entire Balkans" should be included in this nuclear-free zone, a proposal "which we have been repeating for years." Then, aware that he might be criticized in the West for echoing the Soviet line, Tito explained: "Comrades, I think that if some people reproach us today for following the policy of the Soviet Union when we say that the Berlin problem should be solved thus, that atom-free zones should be created, well, these are our attitudes, and if they happen to coincide with the attitudes of the Soviet Union, so much the better. Yet we have no hostile feelings toward the Western countries—not toward a single one of them." (Radio Belgrade, June 8.)

### Visit to Budapest

Although Khrushchev had originally stated that his Albanian sojourn would last until June 6, he announced on May 28 a sudden decision to leave two days earlier in order to stop off in the Hungarian capital and see "my splendid friend Janos Kadar." At the Budapest airport to greet the Soviet delegation were many high-ranking members of the Party and government, including Party First Secretary Kadar and Premier Ferenc Munnich. There was a conspicuous absence of the customary military honors and police precautions, and instead of huge crowds, only some 250 persons were present. All talks were apparently held on an extremely informal basis, and their nature was not disclosed. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], June 4.)

### Missiles in Eastern Europe

Arriving in Moscow, June 6, the indefatigable Soviet Premier delivered a speech before 20,000 people in the Lenin Sports' Palace, where he announced that the USSR would set up rocket bases in all the countries of the Warsaw Pact, if the West rejected his proposal for a nuclear free zone in the Balkans. Citing the "exceptionally favorable conditions in Bulgaria and Albania," he explained that the "high mountains and deep gorges" in those two countries provided "enough room for rocket sites and for having weapons in readiness against the enemy who sets rockets against the Socialist countries." (Radio Moscow, June 6.)

### Reaction to Geneva

In the weeks preceding the Foreign Ministers' Conference, Poland and Czechoslovakia repeated time and again their demands for full representation at the Geneva talks beginning May 11. When the Western Ministers turned down Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposal for immediate Czechoslovak and Polish participation, but left the question open for later consideration, Czechoslovakia greeted this decision as a triumph of Soviet diplomacy. The Czechoslovak Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), May 17, commented as follows:

"The first week of the Geneva conference showed quite clearly that the Western delegations were unable to refute the arguments in favor of the claims of Poland and Czechoslovakia to take part in the discussions on the German question. This is proved by the fact that the question of



our and Polish participation has not been removed from the agenda, but is still under discussion."

Warsaw's *Trybuna Ludu*, May 14, was less enthusiastic over the decision:

"We do not claim Poland's right to participate in the Geneva conference on the grounds of prestige, or even less as one of the great powers. We claim it solely on the right to safe-guard our own well-being and security. . . . At Geneva, the rights of Poland and Czechoslovakia were defended only by the Soviet Foreign Minister. None of the three Western Foreign Ministers attempted to do so."

As the Geneva conference proceeded, the Soviet bloc filled the air with fervid denunciations of West German "militarism" and "revanchism," and fully supported Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposals.

### Reaction to Dulles' Death

Soviet bloc comments on the death on May 24 of the former American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles covered a spectrum from expressions of sympathy to vindictive attack for his alleged policies. Soviet boss Nikita Khrushchev during his Albanian junket took time out to "express his sincere condolences to the US government on the death of Mr. Dulles." Khrushchev also tried to make propaganda capital, however, by claiming that Mr. Dulles had confided to Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan, when the latter had visited the United States, that the American "policy of strength aimed at pushing the [East European] countries back on the road of capitalism" should be abandoned. Khrushchev concluded: "One cannot fail to appreciate this admission by Mr. Dulles. It took courage to make such a statement." (Radio Tirana, May 27.)

Czechoslovakia and Hungary, on the other hand, included in their reports of Mr. Dulles' death a brief review of his policies in the service of "American imperialism." The Czechoslovak news service (May 24) also maintained that "ruling circles" in the United States had carefully



Juvenalia, the annual student festival in the Polish university town of Cracow, was held in the first two weeks of May. Twenty-two thousand students from all over the country were reported to have taken part in the parades, dances, costume parties and general merry-making. Above, festive students, shown on the front page of *Swiat* (Warsaw), May 24, 1959.

concealed Dulles' illness; nevertheless, Mr. Dulles from the time of his first operation in 1956 "still performed a considerable piece of work for American imperialism."

Radio Budapest (May 24) called the late American Secretary of State a "fanatical personality [who] based his policy on the atomic superiority of the United States." The Polish press and radio restricted themselves to brief comments without invective, and the Bulgarian and Romanian news media apparently reported Mr. Dulles' death without any comment.

### Yugoslav Controversy Quiets

While the Foreign Ministers continued their discussions in Geneva, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev toured Albania directing verbal missiles at Italy and Greece, a certain *détente* was evident in the anti-Yugoslav campaign. The number of attacks against Tito greatly diminished throughout the Soviet bloc, and Nikita Khrushchev even enlisted Yugoslav support for his proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans and a "summit conference" of Balkan States (see above). Later, Radio Moscow, June 8, after condemning Greece and Turkey for refusing to participate in such a conference, urged the NATO countries "to believe their ally and partner . . . Yugoslavia, which . . . had supported . . . a meeting of the interested Balkan countries."

### Children

**A**N INVESTIGATION into the health of school-children in the most backward rural areas of Poland was recently concluded. The results, as published in the Teachers' Union weekly *Glos Nauczycielski* (Warsaw), May 10, were depressing. Ninety percent of the children suffer from tooth decay. Physical changes due to rickets were observed in 80 percent of them. Ten percent were found to have lice (this figure rose to 21 percent in Szczecin Province). It was also determined that a certain percentage of the children are habitual drinkers of *bimber*—home-made vodka.

The study involved 387,742 children, living in the remotest regions of the country and attending the "most neglected schools." Most of these children had not had a medical exam in six or even eight years.



## Current Developments—Area

### Students Riot

Except for Communist China, no other Communist nation more than mentioned the report by Marshal Tito on May 21 that student riots had broken out recently in the universities of Zagreb in Croatia and Skopje in Macedonia, two sections which have historically resisted unification. Speaking to representatives of Yugoslav universities on the occasion of his 67th birthday, Tito blamed enemies of his country for fomenting the demonstrations: "Nobody can say that the enemy did not organize [the riots], for I know that the demonstrations in Zagreb and Macedonia are very closely related. This was premeditated. But I am greatly surprised and regret that some of our honest and good youth have been taken in by the enemy and went along in the demonstrations with him."

The uprisings occurred, according to Tito, because of allegedly poor food in the canteens:

"Let us allow for the possibility that the food was bad. In our country, students have the right to manage their own canteens; therefore, let them be responsible themselves for the quality of their food . . . but how did they react? They came into the streets and demonstrated. And now in both the West and the East they are saying that a crusade of hungry students has begun in Yugoslavia . . . [Communist] Chinese propaganda, of course, appeared the first, right after the British and some other radio stations, saying that this was an action of hungry students in Yugoslavia, and this only in order to inflict harm on our country and its prestige. For it is not accidental that this happened right now when negotiations are going on in Geneva and when our country . . . has requested its place in the solution of international problems."

Apparently implying that the "enemies" who had provoked the riots came from the "Socialist camp," Tito explained that "it irks them that Yugoslavia . . . is still boldly going forward in the democratization of our entire social life. They want to provoke us, so that we might revert to the former methods, that is, to Stalinist methods. But we shall never return to them." (Radio Belgrade, May 21.)

### Best Foot Forward

A NUMBER of letters from residents of Warsaw complaining about the condition of the city appeared in the daily *Express Wieczorny*, April 18. One of them said, in part:

"There are still many sections of the city where rats and mice can be seen scurrying around in daylight and where clouds of flies swarm around stinking mounds of garbage. One such forgotten and malodorous corner of Warsaw may be found on Pulawska Street in Mokotow. . . . This small section also houses many foreign legations, consulates, embassies. Right under their windows lie piles of garbage, rubble and not far away the filthy Mokotow Market. Here there is also a pit full of refuse, the bathing place of horses, children and dogs throughout the entire summer. . . ."

### Bulgaria Condemns "Yugoslav revisionism"

A denunciation of the Yugoslavs quite in the standard vein did appear in the Bulgarian trade unions' organ, *Trud* (Sofia), May 19, in an article devoted to a critical analysis of "Yugoslav revisionism." After accusing the League of Yugoslav Communists of declaring itself "the inheritor and interpreter of the principles of Marxism-Leninism," the writer went on to defend the "granite-like unity of the Socialist camp":

"These are the facts. The revisionist fable that the Socialist camp . . . is dominated by one country and one Party is a dirty slander. . . . The unity of the Socialist countries in the world, led by the USSR . . . is a natural phenomenon, regardless of the desire of the Yugoslav revisionists to play a leading role in the world."

### Yugoslav Trade with West Attacked

Another frequently-voiced criticism of Yugoslavia appeared in an article denouncing Yugoslav "economic dependence" on the West and condemning Tito's acceptance of US aid (*Lud* [Bratislava], May 26):

"It is known that the countries of the Socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, build up their economies by using their own means and by friendly, mutual cooperation. Yugoslavia has chosen another road. She has discontinued brotherly cooperation with Socialist countries and is becoming more and more dependent on the capitalist world. It suffices to point out that 77 percent of all her debts are owed to capitalist countries, and that since 1950 the sum of military and economic 'aid' which the United States has granted to Yugoslavia amounts to 1,600 million dollars. . . . We know that the great Western powers do not grant loans out of philanthropic feelings, but that behind every dollar which they allow anybody as credit there is a precise design, i.e. to secure the greatest possible political influence over the country to which such 'aid' is given. . . . It is clear to us what the US is after. The US is taking advantage of the blindness of the leading politicians of Yugoslavia, supporting their destructive policy against the Socialist countries . . . and playing the game of international capitalism."

### Macedonian Controversy Renewed

Yugoslavia repeated once again the complaint that Sofia was mistreating the Macedonian people living in Bulgaria. In a speech delivered to the Third Congress of Macedonian Communists in Skopje, May 22, Macedonian Assembly Chairman Lazar Kolisevski accused Bulgaria of denying the Macedonians "their right to the status of a national minority," and of carrying on a campaign directed against the Yugoslav Macedonians "in order to crack the spiritual-national unity of our people." (Radio Skopje, May 22.)

### Greece, Italy: Charges and Countercharges

While Nikita Khrushchev threatened Italy and Greece with rocket-launching bases in Albania and Bulgaria (see above), Bulgaria carried on its own campaign against the Athens government. Premier Anton Yugov, in an interview published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 8, severely

criticized the Greek government for considering the installation of American missile bases and declared that Bulgaria in no way constituted "a danger to the safety of Greece."

Unsettled war debts was another issue which was straining relations between Greece and Bulgaria. A Greek note on this subject was handed to the Bulgarian legation in Athens, May 10, in which Greece demanded 45 million dollars in war reparations from Bulgaria, as stipulated in the peace treaty of 1947. Bulgaria's reply, in a note of May 21, was that it had on several occasions suggested talks "to liquidate all outstanding economic questions between the two countries . . . however, the Greek government sought several pretexts in order to postpone and even abandon these questions." (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, May 22.)

In a later note, handed to the Greek *chargé d'affaires* in Sofia, Bulgaria rejected the Greek assertion (apparently contained in another Greek note on June 3) that "unsettled financial problems are an obstacle to improving the atmosphere," and saw the causes of their tension "in the NATO policy of war preparations and stationing of missile bases in NATO countries." (Radio Sofia, June 9.)

### Denies Rocket Bases

To what Radio Sofia, June 4, claimed were Greek and Italian assertions that launching sites for rockets had already been installed in Bulgaria came swift denials: "Such reports have a provocative character, and come from just those countries which have made such preparations themselves."

### Romanian Note to Italy

The Italian minister in Bucharest refused a diplomatic note protesting the establishment of American rocket bases in his country. In reporting the incident, *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), May 19, denounced the Italian diplomat for "adopting an attitude which did not conform to diplomatic practice, since he was unable to set forth any substantial reasons [for his refusal]."

### Algerian Committee Meets

The International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with Algerian Workers and People met near Varna, Bulgaria, from May 24 to 28. The session included delegates from the Algerian insurgents, from Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Morocco, France, Chile, Yugoslavia, Japan, and representatives of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. Most of the speakers underlined their solidarity with the Algerian insurgent cause by citing the amount of aid they had extended in the form of foodstuffs, medicines and arms; e.g. from Iraq, 2 million pounds sterling; from Bulgaria, 1.5 million *leva*; and from the Soviet Union, 800,000 rubles. (Radio Sofia, May 27.)

### Yugoslavia Attacked

During the conference, the Yugoslav delegation refused to endorse the final resolution because it included the following sentence: "The Algerian war is waged by the French colonialists supported by US imperialism." Radio

Sofia, May 27, duly fulminated against "Yugoslav revisionism," calling it "the spokesman of imperialism, especially US imperialism, and the enemy of national independence movements."

### COMECON Pushes Integration

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—the Soviet bloc economic organization—held its eleventh session in Tirana, Albania, May 13-16, attended by top planners from the area, including Alexei Kosygin of the USSR. Representatives of Communist China, North Korea, Vietnam and Mongolia were present as observers. The communique, as published in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), May 17, stated that the session had been devoted chiefly to a long-term solution of the fuel and power shortage in Eastern Europe, a problem that has been hindering industrial development since the early 1950's.

The Satellite countries are to increase their total coal production 21 percent by 1965, and their extraction of coking coal by 53.5 percent. Production of the latter is to go up 60 percent in Czechoslovakia, 50 percent in Poland and several hundred percent in Bulgaria. However, this will far from cover Satellite coke requirements; the communique stated that they will continue to rely on "large supplies" from the USSR.

In an effort to ease supplies of electric power, the member States agreed to link their power networks to enable large-scale import and export. One grid will connect the systems of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. There will be "a vast exportation" of electric energy from Romania to Czechoslovakia, based on the joint construction of thermo-electric stations in Romania. Poland will be tied to the Soviet Kaliningrad network (formerly East Prussia) and Hungary will draw from the western Ukraine.

The meeting also gave attention to metallurgical production: that of pig iron is to increase by about 80 percent



Juke boxes have come to Hungary (where they are generically known as wurlitzers, after a manufacturer), and the regime tends to look upon them as evil American influences, especially when they are stocked with the jumpier sort of popular music which youth prefers. Title of cartoon: "A monkey has escaped from the zoo." Caption, waiter to zoo-keepers: "Are you sure, gentleman, that he is the one you are looking for?"

Lúdas Matyi (Budapest), April 16, 1959

## A History Lesson from Marshal Tito

*The following reminiscences of the days of Stalin's Great Purge and of the prewar "liquidations" were delivered in a speech by Yugoslav President Tito, reported in Komunist (Belgrade), April 16, 1959.*

**I**N JANUARY 1937 I arrived in Moscow . . . where the Comintern asked me to be responsible for Yugoslav affairs. . . . I used that time to learn as much as possible. I commuted from the Hotel Lux to the Comintern building and back, and that perhaps saved me from getting under Stalin's knife. I read all the time. I avoided taking part in any discussion, since the NKVD used to listen to conversations by telephone in hotel rooms. . . . Our people had never dreamed that anyone could listen by telephone to what they were saying in their rooms. Therefore, they were surprised to hear that some of them were unexpectedly arrested, and in the majority of cases they were arrested because they gave vent to their feelings."

Recalling those days in Moscow, Tito said: "A number of our people were arrested at that time. . . . They told me to write about the characteristic features of those who were in jail. 'What characteristic features?' I asked. 'I do not know them sufficiently.' And when they asked whom I knew best, I said, 'Horvatin.' 'Write about him,' they said. I wrote impartially.

"I said that Horvatin was theoretically well-indoctrinated, that he was capable, that he was not from a worker's family, but that he was an intellectual, that he has petty bourgeois qualities, but that he was very popular, and so forth. In the end they told me to sign. The next day they called and asked: 'Is he not a Trotskyite?' I told them that I knew nothing about that. Afterwards, whenever they asked me about our people I was cautious and usually said that I did not know them well. . . . I almost got into trouble myself.

"As soon as this was over . . . I received authorization to leave the [USSR]. . . . I saw that the war was all the time getting closer to our country, too . . . but eventually I arrived in [Yugoslavia]. I was overwhelmed. For so many things had been happening in Moscow that I must say that those had been the most difficult days in my life. Even the war was easier, because in war you at least know who and where your enemy is."

On the eve of World War II the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, according to Tito, decided to defend the country against the aggressor: "When the Germans entered Austria, I was in the Comintern, where there was chaos. . . . A session of all Party Secretaries or representatives was convened. It was necessary to work out a proclamation, an attitude concerning the Anschluss. This event was clear to me. I speedily wrote out the proclamation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [condemning Germany]. But many other people were fully tied to Stalin's directives and without any independence.

"You see, comrades, when we view things from our present perspective, our general practices and our attitude toward the cadres who have committed mistakes, it seems strange to remember that many of them were proclaimed hostile elements and physically liquidated.

"In that difficult situation when our Party was terribly persecuted in our country, strong measures had to be taken against those elements who carried on factional strife, but this did not mean that they had to be physically liquidated. Many of them did not deserve to be denounced as enemies. Stalin did so simply to get rid of those who were 'disobedient.' It is for this reason that we shall have to rehabilitate some of them . . . who did not deserve the fate which befell them . . . since they were people who had never been provocateurs or traitors. . . ."

in the area as compared with 1958: steel and rolled products 70 percent; and steel tubes 90 percent. The USSR will support this effort by nearly doubling its export of iron ore to the Satellites.

Specialization in the production of machinery was another concern of the session. The communique gave the following examples of items which will be produced chiefly in one or two countries: small-section rolling mills, East Germany and Poland; large-section rolling mills, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; wire-drawing machines, Hungary and East Germany; equipment for the oil industry, Romania and the Soviet Union; multi-shovel excavators, East Germany and Czechoslovakia; single-shovel excavators, Soviet Union; machine tools for the bearings industry, 40 types in East Germany, 12 types in Poland, 10 types in Czechoslovakia and 55 types in the USSR.

Trade among the member States is expected to increase

70 percent by 1965, on the basis of bilateral agreements. Trade between the Soviet bloc and the Asian Communist countries is also to increase substantially.

The meeting in Tirana came shortly after the tenth anniversary of the organization, celebrated in speeches and editorials throughout the Soviet bloc. It was founded in 1949 as a Soviet response to America's Marshall Plan, but until last year its functions had consisted mainly of coordinating foreign trade and economic planning from its headquarters in Moscow. In May 1958 a meeting of political representatives of the member States in Moscow laid the foundation for a more thorough integration of the national economies through the establishment of permanent international committees for various industries. Since that time the Council and its committees have evidently made some progress toward an area-wide seven-year plan of economic development.

## HUNGARY

### Education Changes Pressed

Following the recent announcements in Prague and Sofia that the school systems are to be reorganized along the lines of Soviet methods of "polytechnicism"—practical on-the-job training to combine learning with work—the Hungarian government, too, has been pushing forward with its own "polytechnical" program (see *East Europe*, June, pp. 46, 48). *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), May 8, reported that the cabinet had adopted a resolution on the further development of technical and practical education. During the 1958-59 academic year, "polytechnical" training was introduced as a compulsory subject in the fifth grade of 551 secondary schools and in 68 high schools. During the next academic year, according to the Party journal, the change will be started in the fifth grade of 500 more schools and in 40 more high schools.

#### Teachers Protest

An article entitled "The Socialist School is the School of Work and Life" (*Nepszabadsag*, May 21) revealed that there is still resistance among teachers to the new methods:

"There still exist among a fraction of pedagogues and primarily among teachers of the humanities a tendency to see in polytechnical education some degradation of human culture. They express their fears openly, saying that polytechnical education brings the school down to the level of the apprentices' school . . . this is an attitude protecting the ideal of the old schools. Practice will, of course, sooner or later convince them . . . that their view is erroneous."

#### New Teacher Training

In a development parallel to the polytechnical education for students, beginning the next school year future teachers will spend several weeks in a large industrial or agricultural enterprise "where, participating personally in the manual tasks of the workers, they will become acquainted with the political and cultural life of the working class or peasantry." Admission requirements for teachers' training schools will also be tightened: henceforth, a matriculation examination as well as the completion of eight grades of general schooling will be necessary. Teachers' training courses will last three years and will provide a much larger amount of instruction in "theoretical" subjects (i.e. Marxism-Leninism) as well as "practical" pedagogy. Child psychology and "educational psychology" will also be studied. Present plans include the opening this fall of eleven teachers' training schools of the new type and three schools with two-year courses for child welfare workers. (Radio Budapest, May 27.)

#### Jobs for Graduates

With the end of the academic year in sight, *Nepszabadsag*, May 27, summarized the possibilities for employment for the new graduates: industrial concerns will easily be able to employ graduates in technology and economics,

but the number of law school and art school graduates is greater than the demand. Three thousand graduates will be able to find employment in industry as apprentices; 2,000 can study in nursing and medical technicians' schools, but only one third this number have so far applied. Only 800 university graduates can be given "job scholarships" (small stipends for one year to supplement part-time earnings while awaiting suitable employment)—last year, 3,000 such scholarships were available. Primarily, these secondary school graduates will be admitted to the universities who have already performed physical work for two years while awaiting an opening. There are not enough graduates who wish to become lathe-operators, metal workers or locksmiths. Employment for women in industry has become more difficult, since no women can be hired in numerous technical fields such as optical work, machine tooling, etc., it was stated.

### Consolidating the Collectives

Pausing after the big collectivization drive in the first quarter of this year, the regime is now stressing the "consolidation" of the new collectives. On May 23 a decree was issued providing for the commassation of land holdings in collectivized areas and the "voluntary exchange" of private holdings where these interfere with collective farming. County governments were authorized to carry out commassation at any time of the year, provided that it did not interfere with farm operations. The decree, which is reminiscent of similar measures employed in former years, means that private farmers can be forced to exchange their land for other land less favorably situated or of inferior quality, as the price of remaining independent.

Another decree of the same date provided that "people active in other spheres of work may join in the work of the [collective farms] and lend active assistance to collective farming." These people, who "by virtue of their professional knowledge might render political or economic assistance," will be allowed to attend meetings in an advisory capacity without being obliged to share in the work of the collective farm. The decree was obviously designed to strengthen Party control over the affairs of the new collectives. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 23.)

### Reorganization of the Writers' Union

Apparently the regime has decided that the Writers' Union, disbanded by the government because of its role in the 1956 Revolt, can finally be revived. (See *East Europe*, April, p. 48.) A preparatory committee charged with defining the tasks and principles of the new association has been set up within the framework of the Literary Council (formed in 1957). According to Gyorgy Boloni, president of the Council, the new Union will be formed early this fall, and "eminent representatives of every shade of Hungarian literature will join it. The association's mission will be to educate Hungarian readers in the spirit of the new society. It should be noted in this connection that Hungarian literature in the Socialist spirit has greatly developed since the counterrevolution." (Radio Budapest, May 15.)



## Current Developments—Hungary



The annual Budapest Trade Fair opened in that city on May 16. Opening-day ceremonies were attended by the highest regime dignitaries, among them, left, Party First Secretary Janos Kadar observing a heavy industry exhibit; right, Politburo-member Gyorgy Marosán fraternizing with waitresses at a buffet.

Photos from *Jovendonk* (Budapest), May 24 and *Orszag Vilag* (Budapest), May 20, 1959

### Pope Accuses Regime of Interference

In a sermon in Rome, May 17, Pope John XXIII protested against the Hungarian State's "attempts to install ecclesiastics who are not approved by this See at the head of the people." Presumably referring to the regime decree requiring State approval for high church appointments, as well as the "loyalty oath" administered to church leaders (see *East Europe*, June, p. 45), the Pontiff stated that Catholic Bishops in Hungary "are being placed in ever harder and more difficult circumstances because of the interference of civil power." He also likened the situation in Hungary to that in Communist China where the regime was placing "Catholics under pastors who are not their true ones." (*The New York Times*, May 18.)

#### Regime Replies

An official answer to the Pope's charges was made by government spokesman Laszlo Gyaros, at his press conference, May 19, when he denied that there was any religious persecution in Hungary: "After the Hungarian church leaders took the loyalty oath [to the State], the Western press has once again tried to revive the outworn slanders about religious persecution in Hungary... but what has happened was only an oath taking, as a civic duty, by the leaders of the church to the laws of the Hungarian People's Republic.... The fulfillment of civic duties is compulsory even in the Vatican. When the present Pope was appointed Bishop, he took the oath before the King of Italy.... There is no religious persecution in Hungary." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 20.)

#### Shakeup in Office for Church Affairs

The Party organ *Nepszabadsag*, June 3, reported that the Council of Ministers had relieved Janos Horvath, Chairman

of the Office for Church Affairs, from his post "because of his assignment to other duties." What these "duties" were was not announced. The new Chairman will be Karoly Olt, at one time Minister of Finance and recently Deputy and Moderator of parliament's Finance Committee.

### Return from the Orient

On May 17, the Hungarian Party-government delegation, headed by Premier Ferenc Munnich, arrived in Budapest after a three-week tour throughout the Communist nations in the Far East. An editorial *Nepszava* (Budapest), published the same day, commented:

"During the Party discussions [in Communist China] it was agreed to continue to fight relentlessly against Yugoslav revisionism, against all revisionist elements, because these are the very elements endeavoring to undermine the unity of the international Communist movement. At the same time, the Chinese and Hungarian Party leaders also took a position against all manifestations of dogmatism, because dogmatism weakens the relationship between the Party and the masses, and hinders the creative application of Marxism-Leninism."

### Cars Suspect

The Ministry of Communications and Post sent out instructions to the effect that the police will be stricter this year when inspecting automobiles, particularly in and around vacation resorts. Apparently this tough policy is occasioned by the fact that "a large number of people are still using for private purposes automobiles which belong to enterprises. In the past three months inspectors have uncovered 170 such cases.... Frequently owners of private automobiles also transport paying passengers." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], June 3.)

POLAND

Foreign Relations

A delegation of the Polish Party's Central Committee, headed by Jerzy Morawski, returned to Warsaw on May 26 after a month's stay in Communist China. During this time, the Chinese Party paper *Jenmin Jihpao* (Peiping), May 21, published an article by Morawski in which the Polish Communist, no doubt thinking particularly of the divergence in Chinese and Polish agricultural policies, stressed the fact that both Parties were in "full accord" on fundamentals while differing on specifics:

"We are united not only in our common striving to

Service of Supply

THE WOEFULLY inadequate supply of many consumer goods—those items, from wall clocks to window panes, which are taken for granted when possessed but are a profound irritant when unobtainable—is still common to most of the area; production is poor, distribution is chaotic, pricing is irrational. Two complaints of these conditions appeared in the Polish paper *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), issue of April 29-May 5, 1959; such frank statements of economic malfunction are more liable to find publication in the Polish press than elsewhere:

"The question of retail prices looks somewhat strange in Poland. Or, rather, the question of determining these prices is strange. For example, when the Lodz cooperative 'Osnowa' wanted to sell curtains of its own make at 14 *zloty* a meter, the State Price Commission would not permit it but established a price of 33 *zloty* per meter. The motive for this was that State industry sells such curtains at 33 *zloty*. There can be no 'unhealthy' competition. . . .

"The case of the wall clocks recently caused a great stir. The State firm 'Jubiler' produced such clocks for 800 *zloty* each, while State establishments in Pigrzyce produced identical ones priced at 400 *zloty*. . . . If it were only a question of clocks alone, though! . . . The pendulum of prices, however, includes many more articles. . . ."

"A window broke in the home of one of the inhabitants of Olsztyn. He went to the glass shop of the 'Cooperation' cooperative, asking for a new pane to be fitted in. 'We only do our work in the shop,' was the reply.

"Do you expect me to bring in the whole window frame? After all, it is rather heavy."

"We can't help that, I'm afraid. We don't do any work in the homes of customers."

"The poor devil went to a private workshop. 'Unfortunately, we have no window glass. The allotment for the first quarter has not arrived yet.'"



A delegation of the Hungarian National Assembly recently visited Poland at the invitation of the Sejm (Parliament). The Hungarian group was headed by Mrs. Istvanne Vass (center), one of the two Deputy Speakers of the Assembly.

Photo from *Swiat* (Warsaw), May 31, 1959

build Socialism, but also by the science of Marxism-Leninism. This fact not only does not exclude, but on the contrary, demands—beyond the introduction in each country of the universally binding principles—the preparation and application of such forms and methods of Socialist construction as are best suited to the conditions of a given country and, by the same token, also the most successful." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 26.)

An indication of closer ties between Poland and Communist China was also seen in the publication of a new monthly, *Chiny* (China), which appeared in Poland for the first time on May 17.

Clash With France

When one Kazimierz Dopierala, a Secretary of the Polish military legation in Paris, was arrested by the French police on May 12, the Western press reported that the French secret service had discovered the existence of a spy ring operating in Paris and transmitting information to East European countries; Dopierala was formally charged with espionage. Radio Warsaw, May 21, announced that in retaliation for this arrest the Polish Foreign Ministry had demanded the recall from Warsaw of J. Lorine, a member of the French military mission in Poland.

Polish Library in Paris

Recently, the Warsaw government announced that the French Institutes in Cracow and Warsaw would be permitted to reopen if the 121-year-old Polish Library in Paris were turned over to the Polish State. While the fate of the library was being decided in French courts, however, the French National Assembly passed a resolution, June 3, declaring that the library "must retain its liberty and integrity." (*Le Figaro* [Paris], June 4.)

Lawyers' Congress Held

The Fourth Congress of Polish Lawyers convened in Warsaw, May 24-27; the two topics most widely discussed were the administration of "Socialist justice" and the fight against economic "abuses" (i.e., the all but universal pilfering and black-market dealing, which is the means of economic survival for so many). Zenon Kliszko, a member of the Politburo and reputedly a close adviser of Party chief Gomulka, called in his opening-day address for an end of

## Current Developments—Poland

"unjustifiable liberalism" among lawyers. According to Kliszko, "Socialist legality" suffers because the organs of justice are losing their "class attitude." In phrases reminiscent of the Stalinist period, he insisted that lawyers have "politico-ideological qualifications and . . . develop a sense of responsibility before the working class and the nation for the defense of the Socialist system and the consolidation of the Socialist order in the community."

Discussing economic crimes, Kliszko said: "It seems to us that the greatest threat to the authority of justice is rooted at the moment in the fact that the judicial apparatus is still not sufficiently committed to and effective in the struggle to protect social property. Cases where the court metes out more severe sentences for crimes against private property than for crimes against social property are still common." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 26.)

In another speech before the Congress, Minister of Justice M. Rybicki stated that new laws, soon to be submitted to Parliament, would facilitate the struggle against economic abuses: "In addition to imprisonment the criminal will also have to pay a fine and his property will be confiscated." (*Trybuna Ludu*, May 27.)

### Railway Fares, Beef Prices Raised

A 26 percent increase in the retail price of beef and a 55 percent increase in railway fares were announced by the government on May 30. The announcement stated that retail beef prices had previously been lower than the prices paid to farmers by the government purchasing agencies, without allowing for the cost of transportation, slaughter and distribution, and that beef had been underpriced in relation to pork. Low railway fares, the statement said, had caused overcrowding of trains and encouraged excessive travel. There was to be no change in commuting fares, but other rates would be increased by as much as 73 percent.

The higher meat prices, it was claimed, will be offset by reductions in the prices of rice and salt herring, imported respectively from Communist Asia and the Soviet Union. There are large unsold stocks of these items. To compensate for the higher train fares, the government will cut prices on certain woolen textiles, synthetic fabrics, hosiery, some clothing and footwear. (*Trybuna Ludu*, May 31.)

### "Western Territories Week"

Between May 9 and 16, "Western Territories Week" was observed in Poland. In order to demonstrate the great progress made in that area since the war, and the future prospects for further development, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 5, stated that investments destined for industrial expansion in the Western Territories during the next five years are expected to reach the sum of 34 billion *zloty*. Out of 23 billion *zloty* earmarked for the development of the country's agricultural sector, 12 billion will be invested in the Western Territories.

Reporting on the state of higher education in that region, Deputy Minister of Higher Education Eugenia Krassowska pointed out that before the Second World War there were only two institutions of higher learning in the Territories—in Wrocław and Gdansk; now, she said, there are 21 such schools. (*Trybuna Ludu*, May 5.)

### Peasant Day Observed

Throughout Poland on May 17, Peasant Day was celebrated. The observances were organized by the United Peasant Party (at one time an agrarian centrist movement, now a rural adjunct of the Polish Communist Party). In one of the main speeches, at Gubin near the East German border, Sejm (Parliament) Speaker Czesław Wycech, defending the Oder-Neisse boundary, declared that "the initiative for the transfer of Germans [from the Western Territories] came from US President Roosevelt, who

### Pleasure

AT A PRESS conference in Budapest on April 10, Laszlo Gyáros, spokesman for the Kadar regime, was asked by a Western journalist: "Numerous Western newspapers are drawing a parallel between events in Tibet and the [Hungarian 1956 Revolt]. Have you any comment to make in this connection?"

Gyáros answered as follows:

"Western newspapermen are fond of drawing historic parallels between events even if there is no essential connection between them. Between the 1956 counterrevolution in Hungary and the present counterrevolutionary uprising in Tibet, however, a very essential common denominator can be discerned, despite the difference in historical and social conditions—both uprisings were organized by the imperialists, making use of counterrevolutionary forces within the countries, and both uprisings were directed against the fundamental interests of the popular masses.

"The imperialists and the pitiful figures of the Chiang Kai-shek clique cannot acquiesce in the defeats sustained in the Taiwan conflict; they would like to bring about confusion and disquiet at all costs, in any part of the world. It would be useful for them also if they were able by this means to spoil relations between India and China. The counterrevolutionary rising in Tibet forms an integral part of US endeavors aimed at the widening of the existing aggressive military pact of SEATO in that area. That is borne out by the US State Department's assurance to rebels of 'profound sympathy' after the crushing of the revolt. . . .

"The [Hungarian] government and the entire Hungarian people have learned with pleasure of the liquidation of the uprising in Tibet. The Hungarian government assures the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, the Tibetan people and their progressive leaders of its sympathy and full support in the struggle to overcome the damage caused by the counterrevolutionary uprising. We are convinced that the dissolution of the reactionary local government of Tibet and the formation of the people's own organs of government have cleared the way toward complete advancement for the people of Tibet."

(*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 11, 1959.)

## Current Developments—Poland, Czechoslovakia

wanted to stabilize European and world relations for many years to come." (Radio Warsaw, May 17.)

### US Aid to Poland

The United States and Poland signed a new sales and credit accord amounting to \$50,000,000 on June 10, according to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 12. This figure represents an approximate 50 percent reduction in aid as compared to the agreements signed in 1957 and 1958. Surplus American farm products totalling \$44,000,000 will be sold to Poland; the remaining credits will be used to purchase poliomyelitis vaccine (\$4,000,000) and to pay freight charges on the agricultural products.

### Piasecki-Gomulka Meeting

For the first time since his return to power, Western sources have reported, Party boss Wladyslaw Gomulka had an interview with the leader of the pseudo-Catholic pro-Communist PAX movement, Boleslaw Piasecki. The Piasecki organization had been granted economic concessions during the Stalinist period, at which time Piasecki was able to set up a book and newspaper publishing house. After Piasecki had publicly opposed Gomulka's ascent to power in October 1956, relations between the PAX movement and the regime were apparently quite tense.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Collectivization Slows

Expansion of the collectivized sector of agriculture was comparatively slow during the first quarter of 1959, according to figures released by the Czechoslovak News Agency (Prague) on May 25. Another 143 collective farms were formed, bringing the total to 12,283 with a membership of 886,885 and 4,438,908 hectares of agricultural land (74.7 percent of the country's total). The "Socialist sector," including collective farms, State and school farms, and farms of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, comprised 79 percent of the country's agricultural land. At the end of December 1958 collective farms had possessed 4,289,618 hectares of agricultural land and 851,734 members. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], January 16.)

### Austria, West Germany Criticized

While discussion on Berlin and German reunification proceeded in Geneva, regime officials throughout the area continued to revile "West German militarism and revanchism." The Czechoslovaks particularly seized upon a May 17 rally of Sudeten Germans held in Vienna. Before a gathering estimated at more than 250,000, Dr. Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, the Sudeten leader, had urged the crowd "to carry on the fight for a free homeland," according to Western sources. Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab, although he expressed sympathy for the expelled Sudeten Germans, explained that no one had anything to fear from the rally.

Raab's words did not assuage official Czechoslovak ire.

A note protesting the "Sudeten Days" gathering was handed to the Austrian Minister in Prague on May 20. In the text, made public over Radio Prague the same day, the Austrian Chancellor was accused of lending "support to those who are trying to instigate hatred and aggravate international tension." Furthermore, Lodgman's speech was characterized as being "completely in the Nazi spirit of *Drang nach Osten* . . . and the need for a *Lebensraum*."

Two days after the official protest, a "peace rally" was held in Prague at which the "provocative, revanchist 'Sudeten German Days'" were heartily condemned and a resolution asking Czechoslovak and Polish participation in the Geneva conference was unanimously adopted. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 23.)

### Revanchist Stamp Collectors

"Revanchist provocation" was also seen in a proposed international stamp exhibition in Hamburg, where, according to *Rude Pravo*, May 21, a brochure had been printed showing parts of the territory of "some Socialist countries" marked as German territory; the existence of the East German regime was ignored. For these reasons, Czechoslovak philatelists "cannot possibly accept the invitation to participate in this . . . exhibition . . . and protest emphatically against it."



The Czechoslovak regime has recently mounted a campaign for secular ceremonies to replace church christenings. Above, mothers and children at a so-called "Welcome into Life," as shown in *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), June 6, 1959. The Prague weekly *Kvety*, April 1, describing such a ceremony, explained how the chairman of the local National Committee presides, how a group of Pioneers—the youngest Communist youth organization—chants: "Welcome to this world little baby, father's pride, mother's happiness, sweet baby, new life, little bunch of flowers blooming at a crossroad."



### Fourth Trade Union Congress

A generally uneventful Congress of the National Trade Union organization took place in Prague, May 13-19. During the proceedings, the Central Trade Union Council was elected with no significant changes in membership; Chairman Frantisek Zupka was re-elected. At the only dramatic moment of the Congress, the Yugoslav delegation walked out when a Czechoslovak delegate "noted with regret" that the Yugoslav trade unions had not participated in the conference of European trade unionists, convened in Goerlitz, East Germany, May 8-10, "in support of the [Soviet] solution to the German question." (*Prace* [Prague], May 19.)

According to the final resolutions, outdated pre-Communist legislation governing the Plant Committees (organs of the trade unions) will be replaced soon by new parliamentary enactments.

### Czechoslovak Institute in Cairo

Although relations between the Soviet bloc and the United Arab Republic have apparently been steadily deteriorating since the Iraqi coup (see *East Europe*, June, p. 39), evidence that cultural ties between Prague and Cairo, at least, are being maintained came with the announcement that Prague University's Czechoslovak Institute in Cairo was formally opened on May 20. Scholars at the Institute will concentrate on Egyptology and Arabic Studies. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 22.)


## BULGARIA

### Bulgarian State Visit

On May 21, an official delegation of the Bulgarian Communist Party and government, headed by Party First Secretary Todor Zhivkov and Premier Anton Yugov, arrived in Czechoslovakia for a week's visit. In the many speeches delivered during the tour throughout the country, the Czechoslovak leaders repeated their demand that Poland and Czechoslovakia be admitted to the Geneva Foreign Ministers' conference as full participants, and condemned the Austrian government for allowing its members to take part in the "Sudeten German Days" (see above); Bulgarian officials fully supported the Czechoslovak positions. In the final communique which appeared in *Rude Pravo* (Prague,) May 29, both delegations joined in praise for the USSR, the decisions of the 21st Soviet Party Congress, and vigorously attacked "German revanchism" and "Western imperialism."

### Silence on Tito

Although Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have been in the forefront of the recent offensive against Yugoslavia, there was apparently no mention of "Yugoslav revisionism" or, for that matter, of Yugoslavia in any respect during the Bulgarian leaders' visit. Later, en route to Sofia after a brief



Area-wide complaints about the critical housing shortage and the slowness of new construction continue. Above, foreman to workers: "Don't attempt to deny it. Monday you shirked."

Cartoon from *Rohac* (Bratislava), May 29, 1959

stopover in Budapest to exchange amenities with Hungarian First Secretary Janos Kadar, Zhivkov and Yugov, emulating the example set by Soviet Premier Khrushchev a week earlier, sent fraternal greetings to "the Yugoslav peoples."

### Party Writers Lectured

"Closer to Life, More Among the People" was the slogan of the meeting of the Party members of the Bulgarian Writers' Union in Sofia, May 29. Secretary of the Party's Central Committee Mitko Grigorov addressed the writers on the ideological tasks of the Party and "the need to intensify the struggle against bourgeois ideology and revisionism." He stated:

"A great number of works reflecting Socialist construction and the stormy spirit in which our people are involved in their struggle to pre-fulfill the Third Five Year Plan have already appeared. . . . This, of course, is only a beginning, but the trend is perfectly correct. Now more than ever before it is necessary for Bulgarian writers to make even closer contacts with life . . . to become even more closely united in their Marxist-Leninist positions in order to carry out with honor their most important task—to create highly ideological works on contemporary subjects of high artistic quality." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], May 30.)

## Those Bourgeois Degeneracy Blues

THE FOLLOWING HEART-RENDING account of the musical perils lurking in Bulgarian restaurants and bars appeared in *Trud* (Sofia), March 20:

"Recently a conference took place in the Ministry of Education and Culture which prompted us to serious thought. Employees from the Ministry, musicians, representatives of trade organizations which deal with the public, restaurant managers and others sat around the table. The question was: the orchestras in Sofia restaurants; compositions, skill and, primarily, repertoire.

"Some time ago, a similar conference took place in the Ministry, at which a commission was given the task of visiting all restaurants in which orchestras play. Now this commission is making its report.

"Some of the musicians are nervous, others smile condescendingly. After the report, silence. Who will start? Finally, the manager of Bulgaria Restaurant, V. Vlaev, gets up. The statement of this mustachioed citizen is said clearly and distinctly and put down word for word:

"We are bartenders, and what we are interested in is to have the orchestras influence the public so that each customer drinks two bottles of wine instead of one."

"This is, of course, the bartenders' morality. And when did it happen? It occurred one year after the Decree For Fight Against Alcoholism was issued and shortly after the XXI Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was held, at which Comrade Khrushchev spoke quite clearly and simply on the need of a systematic fight against alcoholism. A disgrace! Most probably this bartender is alone. No, he speaks in behalf of his colleagues too, who support him immediately. For instance, the representative of 'Zdrava Hrana' (Health Food), S. Smilov, a young and elegant man, declares, with the gesture of one who knows very much, that it is natural for bands to play jazz music after midnight and that the desires of the customers must be taken into consideration. The representative of CUS (Central Universal Store), Comrade Neichev, says openly: 'We can not keep orchestras which do not bring in customers!' This is the essence of the bartenders' philosophy.

"Hear, now, comrades, in the name of this philosophy, what is the alluring repertoire of our places of entertainment. The commission which visited the restaurants reports that on January 31, at 12 midnight, the orchestra in Opera Restaurant played the following: mambo, charleston, Columbia Boogie, chachacha, B-47 Waltz, If I Had My Way Boogie, Boston Fox Trot, Fox Trot Boogie, Rock-Rock Rock-and-Roll, K-2 Swing, Mambo Rhapsody, Gypsy Mambo, and others. Let us hear what is played in the bar of the Central Universal Store: mambo, calypso, boogie-woogie, slow fox trot, swing, swing boogie, chachacha and others.

"Is this unfortunate? One of the orchestra men jumps up. 'Don't look at the names, they are really good songs. It is true that sometimes we play mambos.' Somewhere from the other end of the table a man's howl is heard. The accidental visitor could get frightened. Oh, don't be scared, little man, this is a musician who is demonstrating



The ideological horror of jazz displayed by the Bulgarian regime outdoes that of the Soviets. Indeed, what the Soviet please to call jazz is far from unknown in the USSR. Above, for example, are members of a jazz band formed by university students in Georgia, as shown in the Hungarian weekly *Ország Világ* (Budapest), March 25, 1959.

the beauty of these songs—the howls of the different mambos.

"The mutual accusations start: 'The repertoire is very poor. What should we play? What do the composers write? In six months, twenty Bulgarian songs. . . !'

"In honor of the cultural workers who were present at the conference, the supporters of the bartenders' philosophy had to stop talking. The Secretary of the Composers' Union, L. Sagaev, says: 'One hundred thousand people in our country listen every day to the orchestras in the restaurants and in other places of entertainment. We will not permit you to lead these people astray!' 'You want to use music to make these people drink,' said Alexander Hristoskov. 'Nobody in our country composes such music.'

"No! Nobody is for a ban on entertaining and dance music. But jazz music, which teases man's lowest passions, tickles his primitive instincts, is not for our country. In the orchestras' approved repertoire there is no such kind of music. The musicians who play in orchestras have no organizational life. There is no educational work among them. . . . They include bearers of decadent bourgeois morals. The misfortune, however, is not only this.

"Restaurant managers select orchestra players as they please. They do not comply with the order that orchestra players must first of all be approved by the Education and Culture Department. They engage singers with no standing and pay them 80 *leva* per evening to contort and sing dissolute songs. . . . Foreign orchestras and singers are engaged whose shows have a bad influence on the public.

"And in the end who is the loser? The people. The family. Youth. Because through such orchestras, through such shows, the pervasive Western morality penetrates our country. This is one of the invisible roads through which the West introduces its agents of decadence into the consciences of our workers."

## Recent and Related

**Aspects of Revolt**, by Max Nomad (New York: Bookman, 1959, 311 pp., \$5.00). This is a new collection of essays on nineteenth and twentieth century radicalism by the author of "Rebels and Renegades" and "Apostles of Revolution." The book contains many well written accounts of famous revolutionists, as well as interesting profiles of less known, or even entirely unknown, theorists of social change and revolution. On the basis of this material a question arises—"what happens to the regimes established as a result of a victorious revolution?" The author's answer is a brand of the "circulation of elites" doctrine, and he analyses the "permanent turnover of masters." He also comments on a variety of political and social problems, and on the American scene. There is a special chapter devoted to women in revolt. Mr. Nomad's judgments of events, persons and theories are highly colored by his own attitude of a "heretic with a sense of humor", who is always on the side of the underdog and seems impartially to condemn all social systems. Index.

**Friends and Enemies**, by Adlai E. Stevenson (New York: Harper, 1958, 102 pp., \$2.95). A report of what the author learned during his 7,000-mile journey through the Soviet empire. Although it contributes hardly anything new to the store of already available information about the USSR, Adlai Stevenson's book is lively, filled with humor and refreshing observation. He evaluates the seriousness of the Soviet bid for foreign trade, the formidable growth of its industry, and the threat its industrial and scientific development poses in the underdeveloped countries. He also discusses the significance of the rise of a new managerial elite, new developments in Soviet education, and the agricultural effort being made in Siberia. He particularly stresses Soviet uneasiness about Red China: "Our number one problem is China—and so is Russia's", Stevenson writes, and then concludes that the Cold War has changed in its emphasis from military to economic matters. Illustrations.

**My Russian Journey**, by Santha Rama Rau (Harper, \$4.50). A well written though rather superficial account of the author's journey through the USSR which took her and her family from Leningrad to Moscow to Uzbekistan. Interwoven with the personal narrative are comments on the theater, art, social customs and personalities in Russia.

**The Great Prince Died**, by Bernard Wolfe (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959, 398 pp., \$4.50). The sequence of events which led to Trotsky's assassination by an agent of Stalin's police is the theme of this interesting novel. The author, a former aide of Trotsky in Mexico, and a novelist of some experience, bases his book on first-hand knowledge, on the documentary evidence contained in S. Salazar's *Murder in Mexico* and on some ingenious psychological hypotheses by means of which he tries to explain the last years of Trotsky's life. Because of certain departures from reality in this historical novel the name of the protagonist is changed to Victor Rostov; there is not the slightest doubt, however, that Rostov is Trotsky. Wolfe explains and justifies his use of the fictional medium in a long postscript (in which he also presents his views on a variety of moral and political issues). In this psychological reconstruction Trotsky struggles during his Mexican exile with the ever present memory of the Kronstadt rebellion and its implications, and although besieged by doubts which no "dialectics" can explain away, he is unable to admit that (as the author believes) Trotskyism is nothing but "Stalinism manqué."

**The Privilege was Mine**, by Zinaida Schakovskoy (New York: Putnam, 1959, 318 pp., \$4.00). An eyewitness account of Russia today written by a princess, born in Russia, who had the unique experience of returning to her native land nearly forty years later as the wife of a foreign diplomat. Her visit coincided with the post-Stalin thaw and she was able to observe the changes of material consequence that Soviet society has undergone and continues to undergo. Princess Schakovskoy met many Soviet citizens, from peasants to Party leaders, and had revealing conversations on the comparative philosophy and ethics of East and West.

**War and The Soviet Union**, by H. S. Dinerstein (Praeger, \$5.50). Soviet military and political views are surveyed in this book, detailing Soviet attitudes toward surprise nuclear attack and plans about a large-scale nuclear war. It is based on an examination of Russia's press, books and military journals and prepared as part of the research undertaken for the US Air Force by the Rand Corporation. Notes, index.

**Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism**, by Charles Jelavich (Los Angeles: University of California, 1958, 304 pp., \$4.50). A study of Russian influence on the internal affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia in the years 1879 to 1886. In addition to giving the historical background, the author, an Associate Professor of History at the University of California, discusses in detail the specific issues in Russo-Bulgarian and Russo-Serbian relations: the controversy in Bulgaria over the Russian-sponsored Bulgarian constitution, the Bulgarian railroads, the control of the Bulgarian army, and the personal animosities between the Tsar and Prince Alexander of Battenberg; and, in Serbia, the ouster of Metropolitan Mihailo. Particular attention is paid to the dramatic culmination of the national struggle in these countries: the union of the two Bulgarias, the Serbo-Bulgarian War, and the kidnapping of Prince Alexander. Selected bibliography, index.

**The Man with the White Eyes**, by Leopold Tyrmand (New York: Knopf, 1959, 434 pp., \$4.95). This crime novel was published in Warsaw in 1956 under the title *Zły* ("The Bad One"), and is now translated into English by David Welsh. Although there is nothing visibly political about the book, it created a sensation in Poland, mainly because of its many details of the sordid underworld which theoretically has no place in a Marxist State. Descriptions of the seamy side of life in Warsaw help in understanding the ferment that led to the Polish upheaval in October 1956.

**I Remember**, by Boris Pasternak (*Pantheon*, \$3.75). The main value of this "Sketch for an Autobiography" is not in its personal revelations or biographical details but in the disclosure of Pasternak's literary opinions and attitudes toward individuals, ideas and artistic movements. One section is devoted to various poets and novelists he knew between 1920 and 1940, and to his sharp and original appraisal of their work. A long essay on translating Shakespeare has been added at the end of the autobiographical sketch. Notes, illustrations.

**Bibliography of American Publications on East Central Europe 1945-1957**, by Robert F. Byrnes (*Indiana University*, \$2.50). A comprehensive listing; in his introduction the author discusses the state of East European scholarship in America.

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